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I. Introduction 
Chaka Fattah, Sr., a powerful and prominent fixture in 
Philadelphia politics, financially overextended himself in both 
his personal life and his professional career during an 
ultimately unsuccessful run for mayor. Fattah received a 
substantial illicit loan to his mayoral campaign and used his 
political influence and personal connections to engage friends, 
employees, and others in an elaborate series of schemes aimed 
at preserving his political status by hiding the source of the 
illicit loan and its repayment. In so doing, Fattah and his allies 
engaged in shady and, at times, illegal behavior, including the 
misuse of federal grant money and federal appropriations, the 
siphoning of money from nonprofit organizations to pay 
campaign debts, and the misappropriation of campaign funds 
to pay personal obligations. 
Based upon their actions, Fattah and four of his 
associates—Herbert Vederman, Robert Brand, Bonnie 
Bowser, and Karen Nicholas—were charged with numerous 
criminal acts in a twenty-nine count indictment. After a jury 
trial, each was convicted on multiple counts. All but Bowser 
appealed. As we explain below, the District Court’s judgment 
will be affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
II. Background1 
During the 1980s and ’90s, Fattah served in both houses 
of the Pennsylvania General Assembly, first as a member of 
the House of Representatives and later as a Senator. In 1995, 
                                              
1 The facts are drawn from the trial record unless otherwise 
noted. 
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Fattah was elected to the United States House of 
Representatives for Pennsylvania’s Second Congressional 
District. In 2006, Fattah launched an unsuccessful run for 
Mayor of Philadelphia, setting in motion the events that would 
lead to his criminal conviction and resignation from Congress 
ten years later. 
A. The Fattah for Mayor Scheme 
Fattah declared his candidacy for mayor in November 
of 2006. Thomas Lindenfeld, a political consultant on Fattah’s 
exploratory committee, believed that “[a]t the beginning of the 
campaign, [Fattah] was a considerable . . . candidate and 
somebody who had a very likely chance of success.” JA1618. 
But Fattah’s campaign soon began to experience difficulties, 
particularly with fundraising. Philadelphia had adopted its 
first-ever campaign contribution limits, which limited 
contributions to $2,500 from individuals and $10,000 from 
political action committees and certain types of business 
organizations. Fattah’s fundraising difficulties led him to seek 
a substantial loan, far in excess of the new contribution limits. 
1. The Lord Loan and Its Repayment 
While serving in Congress, Fattah became acquainted 
with Albert Lord, II. The two first met around 1998, when Lord 
was a member of the Board of Directors of Sallie Mae. 
As the May 15, 2007 primary date for the Philadelphia 
mayoral race approached, Fattah met Lord to ask for 
assistance, telling Lord that the Fattah for Mayor (FFM) 
campaign was running low on funds. Fattah asked Lord to meet 
with Thomas Lindenfeld, a political consultant in Washington, 
9 
D.C., and part-owner of LSG Strategies, Inc. (Strategies), a 
company that was working with the FFM campaign and that 
specialized in direct voter contact initiatives. Lindenfeld had 
been part of the exploratory group that initially considered 
Fattah’s viability as a candidate for mayor. Lindenfeld had 
known Fattah since 1999, when Fattah endorsed Philadelphia 
Mayor John Street. Through Fattah, Lindenfeld had also gotten 
to know several of Fattah’s associates, including Herbert 
Vederman, Robert Brand, and Bonnie Bowser. Herbert 
Vederman, a businessman and former state official, was the 
finance director for the FFM campaign. Robert Brand owned 
Solutions for Progress (Solutions), a “Philadelphia-based 
public policy technology company, whose mission [was] to 
deliver technology that directly assists low and middle income 
families [in obtaining] public benefits.” JA6551. Bowser was 
Fattah’s Chief of Staff and campaign treasurer, and served in 
his district office in Philadelphia. 
Lord’s assistant contacted Lindenfeld to arrange a 
meeting, and Lindenfeld informed Fattah that he would be 
meeting with Lord. Lindenfeld, along with his partner, Michael 
Matthews, met with Lord and discussed Fattah’s need for funds 
to mount an intensive media campaign. After that meeting, 
Lindenfeld reported to Fattah that Lord wanted to help, but that 
they had not discussed a specific dollar amount. 
Approximately a week later, Fattah instructed Lindenfeld to 
meet with Lord a second time. Lord “wanted to know if he 
could give a substantial amount of money, a million dollars” to 
Fattah’s campaign. JA1630. That prompted Lindenfeld to reply 
that the amount “would be beyond the campaign finance 
limits.” Id. 
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Lord proposed a solution: he offered to instead give a 
million dollars to Strategies in the form of a loan. To that end, 
Lindenfeld had a promissory note drafted which specified that 
Lord was lending Strategies $1 million, and that Strategies 
promised to repay the $1 million at 9.25% interest, with 
repayment to commence January 31, 2008. Lindenfeld later 
acknowledged that the promissory note would make it appear 
as though Lord’s $1 million was not a contribution directly to 
the Congressman, although he knew that it was actually a loan 
to the FFM campaign. Indeed, Lindenfeld confirmed with 
Fattah that neither Lindenfeld nor Strategies would be 
responsible for repayment. With that understanding, 
Lindenfeld executed both the note and a security agreement 
purporting to encumber Strategies’ accounts receivable and all 
its assets. 
On May 1, shortly before the primary election, Lord 
wired $1 million to Lindenfeld. Lindenfeld held the money in 
Strategies’ operating account until Fattah told him how it was 
to be spent. Some of the money was eventually used for print 
materials mailed directly to voters. And, at Fattah’s direction, 
Lindenfeld wired a substantial sum to Sydney Lei and 
Associates (SLA), a company owned by Gregory Naylor which 
specialized in “get out the vote” efforts. 
Naylor had known Fattah for more than 30 years.2 
During the campaign, Naylor worked as the field director and 
                                              
2 Naylor first worked with Fattah when he was in the state 
legislature. When Fattah was elected to Congress, Naylor 
worked in his Philadelphia office. Naylor met Nicholas when 
she joined Fattah’s staff at some point in the 1990s. After 
concluding her employment with Fattah’s office, Nicholas 
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was in charge of getting out the vote on election day. On the 
final day of the campaign, Naylor worked with Vederman, who 
allowed Naylor to use his credit card to rent vans that would 
transport Fattah voters to the polls. 
As the primary date neared, Fattah and Naylor knew the 
campaign was running out of money. The campaign was 
unable to finance “media buys,” and Naylor needed money for 
field operations to cover Philadelphia’s more than one 
thousand polling places. In early May, Lindenfeld called 
Naylor to say that Lindenfeld “would be sending some money 
[Naylor’s] way.” JA3057. Within days, SLA received a six-
figure sum for Naylor to use in the campaign and on election 
day. Naylor used the money to pay some outstanding bills, 
including salaries for FFM employees, and allocated $200,000 
to field operations for election day. 
Fattah lost the mayoral primary on May 15, 2007. 
Afterward, Lindenfeld spoke with Fattah, Naylor and Bowser 
about accounting for the FFM campaign money from Lord that 
had been spent. They decided that the amounts should not 
appear in the FFM campaign finance reports, and Fattah 
instructed Naylor to have his firm, SLA, create an invoice. 
Naylor did so, creating an invoice dated June 1, 2007 from 
SLA to FFM, seeking payment of $193,580.19. Naylor later 
acknowledged that the FFM campaign did not actually owe 
money to SLA, and that the false invoice was created to “hide 
                                              
worked with the Educational Advancement Alliance (EAA), 
an education nonprofit entity founded by Fattah. This entity 
helped to recruit underrepresented students for scholarship and 
college opportunities. Around 2009, Naylor left Fattah’s office 
to work exclusively with SLA. Naylor also knew Brand. 
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the transaction that took place earlier” and “make it look like 
[SLA] was owed money.” JA3075–76. Although FFM did not 
owe SLA anything for the election day expenses, the FFM 
campaign finance reports from 2009 through 2013 listed a 
$20,000 in-kind contribution from SLA for each year, thereby 
lowering FFM’s alleged outstanding debt to SLA. 
Of the total $1 million Lord loan, $400,000 had not been 
spent. Lindenfeld returned that sum to Lord on June 3, 2007. 
He included a cover letter which stated: “As it turns out the 
business opportunities we had contemplated do not seem to be 
as fruitful as previously expected.” JA1254. Lindenfeld later 
admitted that there were no such “business opportunities” and 
that the letter was simply an effort to conceal the loan. 
In late 2007, faced with financial pressures, Lord asked 
his son, Albert Lord, III, to collect the outstanding $600,000 
balance on the loan to Strategies. Lord III contacted Lindenfeld 
about repayment and expressed a willingness to forgive the 
interest owed if the principal was paid. Lindenfeld immediately 
called Fattah and informed him that repayment could not be 
put off any longer. Fattah told Lindenfeld more than once that 
“[h]e would take care of it,” JA1652, but Fattah did not act. 
Needing someone who might have Fattah’s ear, Lindenfeld 
reached out to Naylor and Bowser. Naylor talked to Fattah on 
several occasions and told him that Lindenfeld was under 
considerable pressure to repay the loan. Fattah told Naylor 
more than once that he was “working on it.” JA3082–83. 
During his political career, Fattah had focused on 
education, especially for the underprivileged. Indeed, Fattah 
founded two nonprofit organizations: College Opportunity 
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Resources for Education (CORE), and the Educational 
Advancement Alliance (EAA). 
EAA held the annual Fattah Conference on Higher 
Education (the “annual conference”) to acquaint high school 
students with higher education options. JA3079. Sallie Mae 
regularly sponsored the conference. According to Raymond 
Jones, EAA’s chairman of the board from 2004 through 2007, 
EAA offered a variety of programs to provide “marginalized 
students with educational opportunities so they could continue 
and go to college.” JA1360. EAA was funded with federal 
grant money which could only be spent for the purposes 
described in the particular grant. Karen Nicholas served as 
EAA’s executive director, handling the organization’s day-to-
day administrative responsibilities. Nicholas had previously 
been a staffer for Fattah when he was a member of 
Pennsylvania’s House of Representatives. 
CORE was an organization that awarded scholarships to 
graduating high school students in Philadelphia who had 
gained admission to a state university or the Community 
College of Philadelphia. CORE received funding from a 
variety of sources, including Sallie Mae. Because CORE also 
received federal funds, and because EAA had experience 
working with federal grants, EAA received and handled the 
federal funds awarded to CORE. In short, EAA functioned as 
a fiduciary for CORE. When money became a problem for the 
FFM campaign, Fattah’s involvement with EAA and CORE 
soon became less about helping underprivileged students, and 
more about providing an avenue for disguising efforts to repay 
the illicit campaign funds from Lord. 
14 
On January 7, 2008, Robert Brand contacted Fattah by 
telephone. Shortly thereafter, Lindenfeld received an 
unexpected call from Brand proposing an arrangement for 
Brand’s company, Solutions, to work with Strategies. 
Solutions had developed a software tool called “The Benefit 
Bank,” which was designed to “assist low and moderate 
income families to have enhanced access to benefits and 
taxes.” JA1993. During the telephone call, Brand referred to 
The Benefit Bank and suggested a contract under which 
Strategies would be paid $600,000 upfront. JA1666. Shortly 
thereafter, on January 9, 2008, Brand followed up on his call 
to Lindenfeld with an email about “develop[ing] a working 
relationship where you could help us to grow The Benefit Bank 
and our process of civic engagement. While I know this is not 
your core business I would like to try to convince you to take 
us on as a client.” JA6427. Lindenfeld responded that he was 
interested. To Lindenfeld, “this was the way that Congressman 
Fattah was going to repay the debt to Al Lord.” JA1654. When 
Lindenfeld called Fattah and told him of the contact from 
Brand, Fattah simply replied that Lindenfeld “should just 
proceed.” JA1666–67. 
A few days later, Brand emailed Nicholas at EAA a 
proposal from Solutions concerning The Benefit Bank, which 
sought EAA’s support in developing an education edition of 
The Benefit Bank and a $900,000 upfront payment. 
As the January 31 date for repayment of the balance of 
the $1 million Lord loan approached, a flurry of activity took 
place. On January 24, both Raymond Jones, chair of the EAA 
Board, and Nicholas signed a check from EAA made out to 
Solutions in the amount of $500,000. Although no contract 
existed between EAA and Solutions, the memo line of the 
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check indicated that it was for a contract, and Nicholas entered 
it into EAA’s ledger.3 
That same day, Ivy Butts, an employee of Strategies, 
emailed Lindenfeld the instructions Brand would need to wire 
the $600,000 balance on the Lord loan. Within minutes, 
Lindenfeld forwarded that email to Brand at Solutions. Brand 
then made two telephone calls to Fattah. By late afternoon, 
Brand emailed Nicholas, informing her that he had “met with 
all the people I need to meet with and have a pretty clear 
schedule of what works best for us. I am also seeing what line 
of credit we have to stretch out the payments until you get your 
line of credit in place.” JA6558. Brand asked if they could talk 
and “finalize this effort.” JA6558. On January 25 and 26, there 
were a number of calls between Fattah, Brand, and Nicholas. 
On Sunday January 27, at 5:46 pm, Brand telephoned 
Fattah. At 10:59 pm, Brand emailed Nicholas a revised 
contract between EAA and Solutions for the engagement of 
services. Brand indicated he would send someone to pick up 
the check at about 1:00 pm the following day. The revised 
contract called for the same $900,000 payment from EAA to 
                                              
3 Raymond Jones, who was EAA’s Chairman of the Board 
from 2004 through 2007, recalled at trial that the Board had a 
limit on the amount that Nicholas could spend without board 
approval. JA1358, 1369. Nicholas was authorized to sign 
contracts on behalf of EAA for no more than $100,000. 
JA1369–71. Jones did not recall the contract between EAA and 
Solutions, nor did the EAA board minutes for December 2007, 
February 2008, or May 2008 refer to the EAA–Solutions 
contract or to the substantial upfront payment of half a million 
dollars upon execution of the agreement. JA6358–63; 6567. 
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Solutions, yet specified that $500,000 was to be paid on 
signing, with $100,000 due three weeks later, and another 
$100,000 to be paid six weeks out. No due date for the 
$200,000 balance was specified. The terms of the contract 
called for EAA to assist Solutions with further developing The 
Benefit Bank. In addition, under the contract, EAA would 
receive certain funds from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
for a program relating to FAFSA applications.4 
The same evening, Brand sent Lindenfeld a contract 
entitled “Cooperative Development Agreement to Provide 
Services to Solutions for Progress, Inc. for Growth of The 
Benefit Bank.” JA6569. The agreement proposed a working 
partnership in which Strategies would work with Solutions to 
identify and secure a Benefit Bank affiliate in the District of 
Columbia and two other states, and to facilitate introductions 
to key officials in other states where The Benefit Bank might 
expand. The terms of the agreement provided that Solutions 
would pay $600,000 to Strategies by January 31, 2008, which 
would “enable [Strategies’] team to assess opportunities and 
develop detailed work plans for each area.” JA6572. Brand 
copied Solutions’ Chief Financial Officer, Michael Golden. 
Lindenfeld responded to Brand’s email within a minute, asking 
if Brand had received the wiring instructions. Brand 
immediately confirmed that he had. 
Concerned that Solutions did not have $600,000 to pay 
Strategies, Golden talked to Brand, who informed him that 
Solutions would be receiving a check for $500,000 from EAA. 
Early the next morning, Nicholas responded to Brand’s email 
                                              
4 FAFSA is an acronym for Free Application for Federal 
Student Aid. 
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from the night before. She advised Brand that he could pick up 
the check, “but as I stated I am not in a position to sign a 
contract committing funds that I am not sure that I will have.” 
Gov’t Supp. App. (GSA) 1. That same day, a $540,000 transfer 
was made from the conference account, which EAA handled, 
into EAA’s checking account. The conference account was 
maintained to handle expenses for Fattah’s annual higher 
education conference. Prior to this transfer, EAA had only 
$23,170.95 in its account. EAA then tendered a $500,000 
check to Solutions, which promptly deposited the check before 
the close of that day’s business. EAA never replenished the 
$540,000 withdrawal from the conference account. 
Brand received the executed contract between Solutions 
and Strategies on January 28. Even though the contract called 
for Strategies to perform services in exchange for the $600,000 
payment, Lindenfeld neither expected to do any work for the 
$600,000, nor did he in fact do any work. 
In sum, by January 28, Solutions had received $500,000 
from EAA, but it still had to come up with $100,000 to provide 
Strategies with the entire amount needed to repay the Lord 
loan. Golden obtained the needed funds the following day by 
drawing $150,000 on a line of credit held by Brand’s wife. 
Brand and Fattah spoke four more times on the telephone on 
January 29. Trial evidence later showed that, during the month 
of January 2008, neither the FFM campaign bank account nor 
Fattah’s personal account had a sufficient balance to fund a 
$600,000 payment. 
On the morning of January 30, frustrated by the delay, 
Lindenfeld sent Brand an email with a subject line “You are 
killing me.” JA6430. Lindenfeld stated that he had “made a 
18 
commitment based on yours to me. Please don’t drag this out. 
I have a lot on the line.” Id. Brand responded late in the 
afternoon, stating: “just met with Michael. He does the transfer 
at 8 AM tomorrow. It should be in your account ($600K) early 
tomorrow morning.” Id. Lindenfeld replied: “The earlier the 
better.” Id. The following morning, Golden wired $600,000 
from Solutions’ Pennsylvania bank account into Strategies’ 
Washington D.C. bank account. JA2745, 2874. Strategies in 
turn, wired the same amount from its Washington D.C. bank 
account to Lord’s bank account in Virginia. JA2874, 6549. 
Around noon, Brand telephoned Lindenfeld. 
In the days following the exhaustive efforts to meet the 
January 31 loan repayment deadline, four more telephone calls 
took place between Brand and Fattah.5 Naylor learned at some 
point that the loan had been paid off. When Naylor asked 
Fattah about details of the repayment, Fattah simply replied 
“[t]hat it went through EAA to Solutions and it was done.” 
JA3088. 
Meanwhile, at some point in January, EAA received 
notice that the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector 
General (DOJ) intended to audit its books.6 DOJ auditors told 
EAA to provide, at the “entrance conference,” documentation 
containing budgetary and accounting information. EAA failed 
to produce any accounting information. 
                                              
5 By contrast, between October to December 2007, Brand and 
Fattah spoke by telephone only “once or twice [a] month.” 
JA2734. 
6 One of the terms and conditions of a federal grant is that the 
recipient “be readily prepared for an audit.” JA2314. 
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Although Lindenfeld was no longer making demands of 
Brand, Brand was still owed the remaining $100,000 that 
Solutions had paid to satisfy the Lord loan. On March 23, 2008, 
Brand sent Nicholas an email outlining his efforts to contact 
her over the previous two weeks about documentation on the 
CORE work, how to proceed with the paperwork for the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and “how we can get our 
proposed contract signed and the outstanding payments made.” 
JA2749. Nicholas responded that evening, writing: 
I can appreciate your urgency however I do have 
EAA work that I continue to do, including the 
[usual] facilitation of programs, our financial 
audit, the start-up of two new programs[,] and of 
course the DOJ audit. I am still trying to obtain a 
line of credit without a completed 2007 audit and 
things are getting a little uncomfortable now as I 
try to keep us afloat. 
JA6576. Nicholas told Brand that the DOJ auditors were 
making demands and would soon be on site. She noted that 
“[t]hey are still very uncomfortable with your contract amongst 
other things and depending on their findings some of the 
funding received may have to be returned.” Id. Nicholas said 
that she had submitted the paperwork to the state, and she told 
Brand that “in the future . . . as a result of the DOJ audit I will 
not be in a position to do another contract such as this.” Id. 
Shortly after Nicholas’s reply to Brand, Nicholas 
forwarded the Brand–Nicholas email chain to Fattah. The body 
of the email stated, in its entirety: “I really don’t appreciate the 
tone of Bob’s email. I can appreciate that he has some things 
going on however I am doing my best to assist him. Some other 
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things are a priority. He needs to back off.” GSA2. Later that 
night, Bowser sent Fattah an email with a subject line that read 
“Karen N” and a telephone number. JA2752. 
As the audit continued, the auditors found other 
deficiencies. During April of 2008, DOJ issued a notice of 
irregularity to EAA, which resulted in the audit being referred 
to DOJ’s Investigations Division for a more comprehensive 
review. 
On April 24, 2008, Brand emailed Nicholas asking for 
a time to update her on The Benefit Bank. In early May, Brand 
sent another email to Nicholas attaching a revised EAA–
Solutions contract proposal, which decreased the initial upfront 
cost from $900,000 to $700,000. 
Although Solutions and EAA had still not signed a 
contract, EAA paid Solutions another $100,000 in May. That 
money was obtained via a loan to EAA from CORE. Thomas 
Butler, who had worked for Fattah both when Fattah was in 
Congress and when he was in the General Assembly, was 
CORE’s executive director. Butler had been contacted in mid-
May by Jackie Barnett, a member of CORE’s Board who had 
also worked with Congressman Fattah. Barnett informed 
Butler that Nicholas had requested a loan from CORE to EAA, 
and that Fattah, as Chairman of CORE’s Board, had approved 
it. Butler and Barnett withdrew funds from two CORE bank 
accounts and obtained a cashier’s check, dated May 19, in the 
amount of $225,000 and made payable to EAA. The 
withdrawals were from accounts used for Sallie Mae funds and 
other scholarship money. 
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After EAA received the $225,000 check, EAA tendered 
a $100,000 check to Solutions. The check bore the notation 
“Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.” EAA repaid CORE the 
following month. Because EAA lacked sufficient funds of its 
own to cover this payment, EAA drew on grant money that it 
had received from NASA. 
Brand and Lindenfeld continued to communicate 
concerning The Benefit Bank. In July of 2008, a meeting was 
held at Solutions with Brand, Lindenfeld, Golden, and other 
Solutions employees to discuss “an enormous amount of work” 
that Brand wanted Strategies to do. JA1670. Lindenfeld said in 
response “we’d be glad to do that, but . . . we would have to be 
paid.” Id. At that point, someone in the meeting stated that 
Strategies “had already been paid” $600,000. Id. Lindenfeld 
replied: “well, that was for Congressman Fattah, . . . that’s not 
for us. So if you want us to do work, we have to get paid for it 
separately.” Id. Brand became upset with Lindenfeld over his 
comment about being paid because his colleagues at Solutions 
were not aware of the reason for the $600,000 payment. 
Meanwhile, EAA was attempting to meet the demands 
of the DOJ auditors, who were focused on the relationship 
between EAA and CORE. DOJ served a subpoena upon 
Solutions to produce “[a]ny and all documents including, but 
not limited to, contract documents, invoices, correspondence, 
timesheets, deliverables and proof of payment related to any 
services provided to or payments received” from CORE or 
EAA. JA2350. 
Special Agent Dieffenbach, from the DOJ, interviewed 
Nicholas on July 14, 2008. During that interview, Nicholas 
discussed the relationship between EAA and CORE, how 
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invoices were paid, and how consultants were handled. 
Nicholas also answered questions about EAA’s relationship 
with Solutions, including the payment of invoices. She did not 
inform Agent Dieffenbach of the $500,000 payment in January 
or the subsequent $100,000 payment in May. Nor did the 
interview address the EAA–Solutions contract that purportedly 
required those payments, because the contract had yet to be 
produced. 
Solutions failed to comply with the subpoena, 
prompting an email from Agent Dieffenbach on August 26 
asking for an update concerning Solutions’ reply to the DOJ 
subpoena. Solutions then produced an undated version of the 
EAA–Solutions contract that required the $600,000 upfront 
payment. Neither Brand nor Nicholas provided the auditors 
with the January and May checks from EAA to Solutions. 
Efforts to conceal the repayment of the Lord loan and to 
promote the political and financial interests of Fattah 
continued. The FFM campaign reports indicated in-kind 
contributions of debt forgiveness by SLA even though there 
had been no actual debt. In September of 2009, with EAA’s 
ledgers still under scrutiny, Nicholas altered the description of 
the entry for the $100,000 check to Solutions from 
“professional fees consulting” to “CORE Philly.” JA2546. 
Other FFM campaign debt was reduced further after Vederman 
negotiated with creditors. 
EAA never fully recovered from its payment of the 
$600,000 balance on the Lord loan and the audits that took 
place in 2008. It began laying off employees in 2011, and by 
June of 2012, only four employees remained. JA3659. EAA 
ceased operations at some point in 2012. JA1530. 
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2. The College Tuition Component of the FFM Scheme 
Although the FFM campaign was close to insolvent, it 
nevertheless made tuition payments for Fattah’s son, Chaka 
Fattah Jr., also known as Chip. Chip attended Drexel 
University, but had yet to complete his coursework because he 
had failed to pay an outstanding tuition balance. As the FFM 
campaign got underway in 2007, Fattah wanted Chip to re-
enroll in classes at Drexel and get a degree. Fattah asked 
Naylor to help financially, and he did so by writing checks 
from SLA to Drexel toward Chip’s outstanding tuition. By 
October of 2007, Chip was permitted to re-enroll in classes. 
Although Naylor never directly addressed the issue with 
Fattah, he agreed to assist with Chip’s outstanding tuition with 
the expectation that SLA would be repaid. The first check to 
Drexel in the amount of $5,000 was sent in August of 2007, 
with $400 payments in the months that followed until August 
of 2008. At some point, Chip informed Naylor that the payee 
was no longer Drexel, but Sallie Mae. Naylor then began 
sending monthly checks from SLA to Sallie Mae. Those 
payments, in the amount of $525.52, began in March of 2009 
and continued until April of 2011, after which Fattah told 
Naylor he no longer needed to make them. SLA’s payments to 
Drexel and Sallie Mae totaled $23,063.52. 
Naylor’s expectation of repayment was eventually 
realized. Beginning in January of 2008 and continuing until 
November 2010, Bowser sporadically sent SLA 
reimbursement checks from the FFM campaign with a notation 
that payment was for “election day operation expenses.” 
JA3136. The FFM funds had been transferred from the Fattah 
for Congress campaign. These reimbursement checks totaled 
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$25,400. In an effort to conceal the source of the payments to 
Drexel and Sallie Mae, and to make it appear that the younger 
Fattah had performed services for SLA, Naylor created false 
tax forms for Chip. Chip, however, had never performed 
services for SLA. 
3. The NOAA Grant and the Phantom Conference 
In mid-December 2011, when EAA was experiencing 
serious financial difficulties, Nicholas submitted an email 
request to the educational partnership program of the National 
Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) for a grant 
“designed to provide training opportunities and funding to 
students at minority serving institutions” interested in science, 
technology, engineering, and math fields related to NOAA’s 
mission. JA3354–55. The request sought $409,000 to fund 
EAA’s annual conference scheduled for February 17–19, 2012. 
Jacqueline Rousseau, a supervisory program manager at 
NOAA, participated in a conference call with Nicholas shortly 
thereafter and advised Nicholas that the agency could not 
afford the $409,000 request but would consider a smaller grant. 
Rousseau advised Nicholas that EAA would need to submit an 
application if it wished to be considered for a grant. 
Before submitting a grant application, Nicholas emailed 
Rousseau about sponsoring the conference. On January 11, 
2012, Rousseau informed Nicholas that the “NOAA Office of 
Education, Scholarship Programs has agreed to participate and 
provide sponsorship funds of $50K to support the referenced 
conference.” JA6453. Rousseau also informed Nicholas that 
Chantell Haskins, who also worked with the student 
scholarship program, would be the point of contact for NOAA. 
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In February 2012, EAA held its annual conference at the 
Sheraton Hotel in downtown Philadelphia. The conference had 
been held at the same location each year since 2008. 
Nicholas contacted Haskins at some point in early 2012, 
inquiring about the $50,000 grant. On May 8, 2012, Haskins 
sent Nicholas an e-mail which included information about 
submitting proposals to fund a conference for students. EAA 
then submitted a grant application, which Haskins reviewed. 
She advised Nicholas on June 28, 2012 that the grant could not 
be used to provide meals, and that the date of the conference 
would have to be pushed back, with the new date included in a 
modified application. When Nicholas asked if expenses from a 
previous conference could be paid from the new grant, Haskins 
informed her that this was not allowed. 
In early July 2012, Nicholas sent a modified grant 
proposal to Haskins. It eliminated the budget item for food and 
changed the date of the 2012 conference to October 19–21, 
2012 at the same Sheraton Hotel in Philadelphia where EAA’s 
annual conference had taken place earlier in the year. NOAA 
approved a $50,000 grant for the October 2012 conference—a 
conference that would never be held. 
Unaware that no October 2012 conference had taken 
place, NOAA allowed Nicholas access to the $50,000 grant in 
March of 2013. She then transferred the entire amount from 
NOAA to EAA’s bank account a few days later. Naylor had 
performed services for EAA for which he was still owed 
$116,590. JA3119. In discussions with Naylor, Nicholas had 
informed him that the likelihood of EAA’s being able to pay 
him was “[n]ot very good.” JA3120. Yet several days after 
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EAA had received the $50,000 from NOAA, Nicholas sent 
Naylor a check for $20,000. JA3120, 4283. 
On April 3, 2013, Nicholas submitted a final report to 
NOAA concerning EAA’s use of the grant. Notably, page 4 of 
the report stated the conference had been held in February 
2012, while page 17 stated that the conference had been held 
from October 19 to 21, 2012. NOAA issued a notice asking for 
clarification and for a list of students who had been supported 
at the conference. Nicholas failed to file either a clarifying 
report regarding the date of the conference or a timely report 
regarding the disbursement of the grant. Finally, in November 
of 2013, Nicholas submitted the final Federal Financial Report 
in which she certified, falsely, that the $50,000 had been used 
for a project during the period from August 1, 2012 to 
December 30, 2012. 
B. The Blue Guardians Scheme 
In addition to functioning as the conduit for Lord’s $1 
million loan to Fattah’s campaign, Lindenfeld’s company, 
Strategies, also performed services for the campaign. The work 
resulted in indebtedness from FFM to Strategies of 
approximately $95,000. Fattah made several small payments, 
but failed to pay the full amount due. Although Lindenfeld 
spoke to Fattah, Naylor and Bowser about the debt, no 
payments were forthcoming. During a meeting in Fattah’s D.C. 
office, Fattah told Lindenfeld “that [repayment] really wasn’t 
going to be possible because the campaign had been over for a 
long time” and the funds were not available. JA1693. Fattah 
then asked Lindenfeld if he could write off the debt on his FFM 
campaign finance reports. Id. Lindenfeld told Fattah that as 
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long as he was paid, it was not his business how Fattah 
disclosed it on the campaign finance reports. JA1694. 
In lieu of repayment, Fattah suggested that Strategies 
could claim to be interested in setting up an entity to address 
environmental issues and ocean pollution along the coastline 
and in the Caribbean. Fattah explained that creating such an 
entity would make it possible to obtain an appropriation from 
the government. Hearing this, Lindenfeld knew he was not 
going to be paid by the FFM campaign, and was amenable to 
receiving money from an appropriation instead. At a later 
meeting, Lindenfeld told Fattah that the name of the entity 
would be “Blue Guardians.” Lindenfeld consulted with an 
attorney about creating Blue Guardians as an entity to receive 
the federal grant. He emailed Fattah, asking questions about 
how to complete an application to the House Appropriations 
Committee. Fattah provided suggestions, and an application 
was eventually completed. It indicated that Blue Guardians 
would be “in operation for a minimum of ten years,” and, in 
accordance with Fattah’s guidance, requested $15 million in 
federal funds. JA1711–13. 
Lindenfeld submitted the application to Fattah’s office 
in April of 2009. Afterward, a Fattah staffer contacted 
Lindenfeld to suggest that he change his Washington, D.C., 
address to Philadelphia because that was the location of 
Fattah’s district. Fattah later suggested to Lindenfeld that 
Brand might allow the use of his Philadelphia office address, a 
plan to which Brand agreed. 
In February 2010, Lindenfeld submitted a second 
application to the Appropriations Committee. In March, Fattah 
submitted a project request using his congressional letterhead 
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and seeking $3,000,000 for the “Blue Guardians, Coastal 
Environmental Education Outreach Program.” JA6432. Within 
a month, Blue Guardians had both articles of incorporation and 
a bank account. Around that time, a news reporter contacted 
Lindenfeld to discuss the new Blue Guardians entity. The 
inquiry made Lindenfeld uncomfortable, and he ultimately 
decided to abandon the Blue Guardians project. He continued 
to seek payment from Fattah, to no avail. 
Nonetheless, having obtained Lindenfeld’s 
acquiescence to writing off the campaign’s debt to Strategies, 
Fattah started falsifying FFM’s campaign reports. Beginning 
in 2009 and extending through 2013, the FFM campaign 
reports executed by Fattah and Bowser stated that Strategies 
made in-kind contributions of $20,000, until the debt appeared 
to have been paid in full. 
C. The Fattah–Vederman Bribery Scheme 
Vederman and Fattah were personal friends. Vederman 
was a successful businessman who had also served in 
prominent roles in the administrations of Ed Rendell when he 
was Mayor of Philadelphia and Governor of Pennsylvania. In 
November of 2008, Vederman was a senior consultant in the 
government and public affairs practice group of a Philadelphia 
law firm. His assistance to the FFM campaign included paying 
for rented vans used in the get-out-the-vote effort. 
After Fattah’s electoral defeat, the campaign still owed 
more than $84,000 to a different law firm for services 
performed for the campaign. Vederman approached that firm 
in the summer of 2008 asking if it would forgive FFM’s debt. 
Negotiations resulted in a commitment from FFM to pay the 
29 
firm $30,000 by the end of 2008 in exchange for forgiveness 
of $20,000, all of which would appear on the FFM campaign 
finance report. Vederman’s efforts also led to payment by 
Fattah of an additional $10,000 in 2009 to the law firm, in 
exchange for additional forgiveness of $20,000 of debt. It was 
not long after Vederman’s successful efforts to lower Fattah’s 
campaign debt, that Fattah wrote a letter to U.S. Senator Robert 
P. Casey recommending Vederman for an ambassadorship. 
At some point in 2010, Vederman again intervened on 
behalf of the FFM campaign. FFM remained in debt to an 
advertising and public relations firm owned by Robert Dilella. 
By late 2011, Vederman and Dilella had worked out a 
settlement to resolve the outstanding debt. Pursuant to that 
settlement, Dilella received partial payment from the FFM 
campaign: $25,000 in satisfaction of a $55,000 debt. Dilella 
testified at trial that he would not have agreed to retire a portion 
of the debt had he known the FFM campaign was paying 
college tuition for Fattah’s son. 
Vederman helped Fattah financially in other ways. 
Before the 2006 FFM campaign, Fattah and his wife, Renee 
Chenault-Fattah, sponsored a young woman named Simone 
Muller to live with them as an au pair exchange visitor. Muller 
was from South Africa, and her J-1 visa allowed her to serve 
as a nanny and to study in the United States. Muller later 
applied for and received a second visa, an F-1 student visa that 
indicated she had been accepted as an international student at 
the Community College of Philadelphia. The application 
indicated that Muller would again be residing with the Fattahs. 
Notwithstanding this living arrangement, Fattah identified 
Vederman as the person who would be paying for Muller’s trip 
to the United States. 
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By the beginning of 2010, Muller wished to transfer to 
Philadelphia University. This required her to submit 
verification that funds were available to pay for her study. 
Although the Fattahs were Muller’s sponsors, Fattah explained 
to the University’s Dean of Enrollment Services that he was 
submitting a letter of secondary support from Vederman. 
JA3754, 3763–65, 6504. Without Vederman’s January 2010 
letter of support, the University would not have admitted 
Muller. In addition to this pledge of support, Vederman paid 
$3,000 of Muller’s tuition. Shortly thereafter, Fattah resumed 
his efforts to secure an ambassadorship for Vederman. 
In February of 2010, Fattah staffer Maisha Leek 
contacted Katherine Kochman, a scheduler for White House 
Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel. Leek requested a telephone 
conference with Emanuel, Rendell, and Fattah to discuss 
Vederman’s “serving his country in an international capacity.” 
JA2893. In a follow-up email on March 26, Leek sent 
documents to Kristin Sheehy, a secretary to White House 
Deputy Chief of Staff James Messina. The documents included 
Fattah’s 2008 letter to Senator Casey and Vederman’s 
biography. After participating in a telephone conference about 
Vederman with Fattah and Rendell, Messina sent Vederman’s 
biography to the White House personnel office for 
consideration. 
As the April 2010 tax deadline approached, Fattah still 
owed the City of Philadelphia earned income tax in the amount 
of $2,381. Just days before the filing deadline, Vederman gave 
a check to Chip Fattah for $3,500. The younger Fattah quickly 
deposited $2,310 into his father’s bank account. Fattah paid his 
tax bill on April 15. Without Chip’s deposit into his father’s 
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bank account, the older Fattah would not have had sufficient 
funds to pay his tax bill. 
On October 30, 2010, Vederman gave Chip another 
check, this one for $2,800. That same day, Fattah hand-
delivered a letter to President Obama recommending 
Vederman for an ambassadorship. A few weeks later, Fattah’s 
staffer, Leek, sent the letter that Fattah had given to President 
Obama to Messina’s office. That letter pointed out that both 
Rendell and Fattah had sent letters on behalf of Vederman, and 
that he was an “unquestionably exceptional candidate for an 
ambassadorship.” JA6291–92. 
Fattah’s efforts to secure Vederman an ambassadorship 
were unsuccessful. Fattah then shifted gears and sought to 
secure Vederman a position on a federal trade committee. 
Fattah approached Ron Kirk, who served as U.S. Trade 
Representative, and asked him to speak with a constituent. In 
May of 2011, Leek followed up on that discussion by emailing 
Kirk and asking him to meet with Vederman. Kirk met with 
Vederman on June 5, 2011 and explained to him the role of the 
trade advisory committees. Although the two men “had a very 
nice conversation,” JA 3566, it soon became “pretty apparent 
to [Kirk and his staff] that [serving on a trade advisory 
committee was] not what Mr. Vederman was interested in.” 
JA3567. As Kirk put it, “it was obvious that [Vederman] was 
looking for something perhaps more robust in his mind or . . . 
higher profile than one of our advisory committees.” Id. Given 
Vederman’s lukewarm interest, no appointment to an advisory 
committee was forthcoming. 
In late December 2011, the Fattahs applied for a 
mortgage so they could purchase a second home in the 
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Poconos. Shortly after applying for the mortgage, Fattah 
emailed Vederman, offering to sell him his wife’s 1989 
Porsche for $18,000. Vederman accepted the offer. The next 
day, Vederman wired $18,000 to Fattah’s Wright Patman 
Federal Credit Union account. 
The Credit Union Mortgage Association (CUMA) acted 
as the loan processing organization for the home mortgage. 
Because CUMA is required to verify the source of any large 
deposits, CUMA’s mortgage loan processor, Victoria Souza, 
contacted Fattah on January 17, 2012, to confirm the source of 
the $18,000. Fattah informed Souza that the $18,000 
represented the proceeds of the Porsche sale. Souza requested 
documentation, including a signed bill of sale and title. 
That same day, Bowser emailed Vederman a blank bill 
of sale for the Porsche. After Vederman signed the bill of sale, 
Fattah forwarded it to Souza. The bill of sale was dated January 
16, 2012, which was the day before Souza had requested the 
documentation. It bore the signatures of Renee Chenault-
Fattah and Herbert Vederman, with Bonnie Bowser as a 
witness. 
Fattah also provided Souza with a copy of the Porsche’s 
title. It was dated the same day it was sent to Souza, and bore 
signatures of Chenault-Fattah as the seller and Vederman as 
buyer, along with a notary’s stamp. Neither Vederman nor 
Chenault-Fattah actually appeared before the notary. 
Vederman never took possession of the Porsche. Renee 
Chenault-Fattah continued to have the Porsche serviced and 
insured long after the purported sale had taken place. 
Moreover, the Porsche remained registered in Chenault-
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Fattah’s name, and was never registered to Herbert Vederman. 
When FBI agents searched the Fattahs’ home in 2014, the 
Porsche was discovered in the Fattahs’ garage. 
On January 24, 2012, the Fattahs wired $25,000 to the 
attorney handling the escrow account for the purchase of the 
vacation home. Without the $18,000 transfer from Vederman, 
the Fattahs would not have had sufficient funds in their bank 
accounts to close on the home. 
Around the same time that the Fattahs were purchasing 
the house in the Poconos, Fattah’s Philadelphia office hired 
Vederman’s longtime girlfriend, Alexandra Zionts. Zionts had 
long worked for a federal magistrate judge in Florida. Near the 
end of 2011, the magistrate judge retired, leaving Zionts ten 
months shy of obtaining the necessary service required to 
receive retirement benefits. If Zionts could find another job in 
the federal government, her benefits and pension would not be 
adversely affected. Vederman assisted Zionts in her job search, 
which included calling Fattah. Fattah hired her, a move that put 
his congressional office overbudget. Zionts worked in Fattah’s 
office for only about two months, leaving to work for a 
congressman from Florida. 
Tia Watson, who performed constituent services for 
Fattah and worked on the same floor as Zionts in Fattah’s 
district office, testified she had no idea what work Zionts 
performed. Although Zionts contacted Temple University 
about archiving Fattah’s papers from his career in both the state 
and federal government, an employee from Temple University 
observed that Zionts’ work contributed nothing of value to the 
papers project. 
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D. The Indictment and Trial 
Fattah’s schemes eventually unraveled. On July 29, 
2015, a federal grand jury in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania returned a twenty-nine count indictment alleging 
that Fattah and his associates had engaged in a variety of 
criminal acts. Fattah, Vederman, Nicholas, Brand, and Bowser 
were charged with unlawfully conspiring to violate the 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 
18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). In addition to the RICO charge, the 
indictment alleged that Fattah and certain co-defendants had 
unlawfully conspired to commit wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 
1349; honest services fraud, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1346, 1349; 
mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1349; money laundering, 18 
U.S.C. § 1956; and to defraud the United States, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 371. Several defendants were also charged with making false 
statements to banks, 18 U.S.C. § 1014; falsifying records, 18 
U.S.C. § 1519; laundering money, 18 U.S.C. § 1957; and 
engaging in mail, wire, and bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 
1343, and 1344. 
The RICO charge alleged that the defendants and other 
co-conspirators constituted an enterprise aimed at supporting 
and promoting Fattah’s political and financial interests. The 
efforts to conceal the $1 million Lord loan and its repayment 
are at the heart of the RICO conspiracy and the Fattah for 
Mayor scheme. The indictment further alleged that the RICO 
enterprise involved: (1) the scheme to satisfy an outstanding 
campaign debt by creating the fake “Blue Guardians” 
nonprofit; and (2) the bribery scheme to obtain payments and 
things of value from Vederman in exchange for Fattah’s efforts 
to secure Vederman an appointment as a United States 
Ambassador. 
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A jury trial, before the Honorable Harvey Bartle III of 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, began on May 16, 2016, 
and lasted about a month.7 Judge Bartle charged the jury on 
Wednesday, June 15, 2016, and deliberations began late that 
afternoon. The following day, after deliberating for only four 
hours, the jury sent a note to the judge. Written by the 
foreperson, the note read: 
Juror Number 12 refuses to vote by the letter of 
the law. He will not, after proof, still change his 
vote. His answer will not change. He has the 11 
of us a total wreck knowing that we are not 
getting anywhere in the hour of deliberation 
yesterday and the three hours today. We have 
zero verdicts at this time all due to Juror Number 
12. He will not listen or reason with anybody. He 
is killing every other juror’s experience. We 
showed him all the proof. He doesn’t care. Juror 
Number 12 has an agenda or ax to grind w/govt. 
JA5916. 
Shortly after receiving the foreperson’s note, the Court 
received a second communication—a note signed by nine 
jurors, including the foreperson. The second note read: 
We feel that [Juror 12] is argumentative, 
incapable of making decision. He constantly 
scream [sic] at all of us. 
                                              
7 The District Court dismissed one charge prior to trial: an 
individual money laundering count against Nicholas. 
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Id. 
Judge Bartle met with counsel in his chambers and 
advised them of his intention to voir dire both the foreperson 
and Juror 12 in an effort to determine whether the juror was 
deliberating as required by his oath. The Judge also indicated 
that he would “stay away from the merits of the case,” and that 
whether he would voir dire more jurors “remain[ed] to be 
seen.” JA5917. 
Counsel for the defendants objected to the Court’s 
proposed inquiry. As a group, they indicated that while the note 
could be read as suggesting “a flat refusal to deliberate,” they 
were of the opinion that it sounded “more in the manner of a 
disagreement over the evidence.” JA5918. Nicholas’s counsel 
specifically argued that questioning the jurors so quickly after 
the start of deliberations would send a message that differences 
of opinion among a block of jurors could be resolved by 
complaining to the Court. Defense counsel acknowledged that 
the case law gave Judge Bartle wide discretion on how to 
proceed, but suggested that a “less intrusive” course of action 
was preferred. JA5918–19. They collectively urged the Court 
to do nothing more than remind the jurors of their duty to 
deliberate. 
The Government agreed with Judge Bartle’s proposed 
voir dire. In the prosecution’s view, the Court had already 
given proper instructions to the jury on their duty to deliberate. 
The Government further argued that if Juror 12 had exhibited 
bias, as suggested in the notes, he would have lied during the 
voir dire process and his refusal to deliberate would be “further 
evidence of that and his unsuitability as a juror.” JA5921. 
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With all counsel present, and over defense counsel’s 
objections, Judge Bartle ultimately questioned five jurors in 
chambers. He questioned Juror 2 (the foreperson), Juror 12 (the 
subject of the complaints), Juror 3, Juror 6, and Juror 1. 
Judge Bartle began each voir dire by informing the juror 
that he would ask a series of questions, but would not inquire 
into the merits of the case or how any juror was voting. Each 
juror was placed under oath, and Judge Bartle asked, among 
other questions, whether screaming was occurring; whether the 
jurors were discussing the evidence; whether Juror 12 was 
placing his hands on other jurors; and whether Juror 12 was 
unwilling to follow his instructions. 
The foreperson acknowledged that he had written the 
initial note during lunch earlier that day. He stated that Juror 
12 was not willing to follow the law, but instead “want[ed] to 
add his own piece of the law . . . which has nothing to do with 
it.” JA5927–28. The foreperson further testified that Juror 12 
“was standing up screaming” and that “[i]t was everybody 
pretty much against [Juror 12].” JA5929. He testified that Juror 
12 “has his own agenda,” and that Juror 12 put his hand on 
another juror. JA5930. The foreperson also stated that the jury 
had discussed only a single count since the day before, and that 
they were still discussing it. When the District Court responded 
that the jurors should understand that they could take as much 
time as they needed, the foreperson responded: “I understand 
that. . . . [W]e all understand it. But we feel that he’s just—he’s 
got another agenda.” JA5934. 
Judge Bartle advised counsel that he considered this “a 
very serious situation” and that he would proceed to voir dire 
Juror 12. JA5937. Fattah’s counsel renewed his objection to 
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questioning Juror 12, which the Court overruled. Brand’s 
counsel argued that because the Court had decided to voir dire 
Juror 12, it should also voir dire an additional juror. The Court 
agreed to do so. 
When the Court questioned Juror 12, he admitted to 
having “yelled back” at others, but only when they raised their 
voices to him. JA5939. Juror 12 contended that he, in fact, was 
“the only one” deliberating. Id. When an initial vote was taken 
the previous afternoon, his vote “was different than everybody 
else’s.” Id. Juror 12 explained to the other jurors why his vote 
was different, bringing up specific evidence. In response, the 
other jurors said “that doesn’t mean anything” and “pointed to 
the indictment.” JA5940. Juror 12 told the other jurors that the 
indictment is not evidence. Id. In response, the others 
“threatened to have [him] thrown off.” Id. 
Juror 12 testified that a similar sequence of events had 
taken place that morning. After a brief period of deliberations, 
another vote was taken, and with the same result as the 
previous afternoon. A discussion ensued, and the other jurors 
again “point[ed] to the indictment.” Id. Juror 12 told them to 
“read the charge,” “[t]he indictment is not evidence.” Id. They 
read the charge, and Juror 12 again attempted to explain his 
view, but the other jurors paid little attention. Accordingly, 
Juror 12 told the others that if they did not want him there, he 
“[didn’t] want to be [there]”—he would be “[o]kay with it” if 
they wanted him taken off the jury. JA5941. 
Upon hearing this testimony, Judge Bartle again asked 
about the tone of deliberations. Juror 12 repeated that he raised 
his voice only in response to others who did so—he did “not 
want to yell at anybody.” JA5942. Judge Bartle then asked 
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whether he had touched other jurors. Juror 12 replied that he 
had not hurt anyone. When asked if he had put his hand on 
anybody’s shoulder, Juror 12 answered: “I couldn’t remember 
to be honest with you.” JA5946. 
Following Juror 12’s voir dire, the Court summoned 
Juror 3 to chambers. Juror 3 testified that, after discussion of a 
particular count, there was one juror at odds with the others. 
According to Juror 3, “the rest of the jurors pounced on the 
gentleman with the . . . dissenting opinion.” JA5948. Juror 3 
testified that Juror 12 “got very defensive and just a little bit [] 
impatient” and that “the other jurors were very impatient with 
him.” Id. Juror 3 did not recall witnessing Juror 12 putting his 
hand on any other jurors. 
The Government requested that the Court voir dire 
another juror. Defense counsel objected, claiming that the 
questioning “threaten[ed] . . . the entire deliberative process.” 
JA5949–50. Judge Bartle reminded counsel that he had the 
authority to question each juror, and called for voir dire of 
Juror 6. 
Juror 6 testified that the jury had been discussing the 
case and reviewing the evidence, but that Juror 12 “wants to be 
seen” and was “being obstinate.” JA5951–52. According to 
Juror 6, Juror 12 “may not agree” with the conclusion of other 
jurors but “doesn’t give valid reasons as to why he may 
disagree with the charge.” JA5952. Juror 6 also revealed that 
Juror 12 was the first to raise his voice, and that he may have 
touched her and another juror. When asked to clarify what she 
meant by Juror 12 disagreeing with “the charge,” Juror 6 
testified that Juror 12 was “reading maybe too deeply into it 
and putting his own emotions into it instead of just looking at 
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what it says [and] what the facts are.” JA5952, 5955. 
According to Juror 6, Juror 12 “just continues to read past that 
into his own mind of what he feels it should be.” JA5955. Juror 
6 testified that Juror 12’s “justification for some of his 
responses [did not] seem to relate to what the matter [was] 
before [them].” JA5957. 
Judge Bartle chose to hear from yet another juror. Juror 
1 was called and informed the Court and counsel that the jury 
“really [hadn’t] been able to even start the deliberation 
process” in light of the disruptive behavior of “one particular 
individual.” JA5958–59. The particular individual, according 
to Juror 1, was “very opinionated” and “[came] into the process 
with his view already established, refusing to even listen to any 
of the evidence . . . [being] very forceful . . . standing up, 
yelling, pointing his finger.” JA5959. When asked if this 
individual was willing to follow the Court’s instructions, Juror 
1 testified that he “pours [sic] over the documents very well” 
but that he was adding other factors to answer the question on 
the verdict form, such as “what did this person feel.” JA5961. 
When Judge Bartle advised that intent was an appropriate 
consideration, Juror 1 agreed but said that Juror 12 was “trying 
to investigate . . . going way beyond the scope” of the evidence 
before them. JA5961–62. Juror 12, he said, “has an opinion and 
that opinion is established.” JA5962. He stated that Juror 12 
was “not willing to listen to any sort of reason or any sort of 
what everyone else is saying” but instead, was “trying to force 
everyone else to get to his point of view.” Id. “[I]f he feels like 
he’s not getting there, he gets louder and louder and points and 
puts his hand on your shoulder . . . .” Id. 
After questioning the five jurors (Jurors 1, 2, 3, 6, and 
12), Judge Bartle heard argument from counsel. The attorney 
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for the Government pointed out that the Court would have to 
make a credibility determination because Juror 12 stated that 
he did not recall touching anyone. In the Government’s view, 
Juror 12 was disrupting the process and should be removed. 
Defense counsel disagreed. They argued that Juror 12 was 
conscientious and was engaging with the evidence. They 
pointed out that despite the testimony that Juror 12 was reading 
too deeply into the instructions or introducing new factors for 
the jury to consider, Juror 6 had testified that the jurors “talked 
it through” and resolved the concern. JA5965. Defense counsel 
argued that the jury was discussing intent, an issue that was at 
the heart of the case. Defense counsel perceived no breakdown 
in deliberations and argued that dismissal would be premature. 
They suggested, instead, that the Court provide a supplemental 
instruction. 
Judge Bartle decided to adjourn for the afternoon. But 
before he left the courtroom, defense counsel brought two 
matters to his attention. First, in light of testimony during the 
voir dire, they asked that the jury be reinstructed that the 
verdict form and indictment were not evidence. Second, they 
apprised the Judge of the standard for juror dismissal set forth 
in United States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 2007). Defense 
counsel stated that under Kemp, a request to discharge a juror 
must be denied if there is a possibility that the request stems 
from the juror’s view of the evidence. Judge Bartle expressed 
hesitation on reinstructing the jury, but agreed that Kemp 
would control his determination as to whether dismissal was 
appropriate. 
With the following morning came a new revelation. 
With counsel in chambers, the Judge informed them that 
“additional significant evidence” had come to light since the 
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previous day’s recess. JA5980. He placed his courtroom 
deputy under oath, and she proceeded to testify to an exchange 
that had occurred the previous day as she was escorting Juror 
12 back to the jury room after he had been voir dired. 
According to the deputy, Juror 12 stopped her in the hallway, 
placed his hand on her shoulder, and looked her “straight in the 
eye.” JA5981. He then said: “I’m going to hang this jury.” Id. 
The deputy then related that before any further conversation 
could take place between Juror 12 and the deputy, Judge Bartle 
summoned Juror 12 back to his chambers. Later that day, 
however, Juror 12 and the courtroom deputy had another 
exchange. She testified that after all five jurors had been 
questioned, Juror 12 emerged from the jury room and told her 
“I really need to talk to you.” JA5982. She informed Judge 
Bartle and counsel that Juror 12 “said more about how they’re 
treating him and what he’s saying to them.” Id. He flatly stated 
that “it’s going to be 11 to 1 no matter what.” Id. 
There were no follow-up questions for the deputy. 
Instead, defense counsel suggested that what Juror 12 may 
have meant was that he was willing to hang the jury because of 
a lack of evidence. They requested that Juror 12 be asked about 
his comments to the deputy. 
After once again summoning Juror 12 to his chambers, 
the Judge advised him that “[s]ome questions have arisen” 
about what he may have done after being voir dired the 
previous day. JA5985. Juror 12 acknowledged having 
conversations with the courtroom deputy. When asked “what 
happened” and “[w]hat occurred,” Juror 12 responded: 
“Basically, I said that there was a lot of name calling going on.” 
JA5985. He said comments had been made by other jurors 
about his service in the military. He specifically referred to 
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other jurors’ suggesting that he had possibly “hit [his] head . . . 
hard a few times” while serving in a parachute regiment. 
JA5986. He testified he had conveyed these comments to the 
deputy and that he found them offensive. When asked if he said 
anything else to the deputy, Juror 12 responded: “I may have. 
I really can’t recall.” JA5987. And when Judge Bartle followed 
up by asking if he could recall anything else that he said to the 
deputy, Juror 12 simply replied: “No. To me, that was the most 
important thing.” Id. Juror 12 was then excused from 
chambers. 
Defense counsel next requested that the juror be asked 
directly whether he told the courtroom deputy that he was 
going to “hang this jury.” JA5988. Juror 12 was recalled to 
chambers, and the following back and forth took place: 
The Court: You may be seated. And, of course, 
[Juror 12], you know you’re under oath here 
from yesterday? 
Juror 12: Yes, sir. 
The Court: . . . Did you say to [the courtroom 
deputy] that you’re going to hang this jury? 
Juror 12: I said I would. 
The Court: You did? 
Juror 12: I did. I said—I told her—I said, we 
don’t agree; I’m not just going to say guilty 
because everybody wants me to, and if that hangs 
this jury, so be it. 
. . . . 
Juror 12: I did say that, sir. 
The Court: You didn’t remember that before? 
Juror 12: I’m more concerned about people 
spitting on my military record. 
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The Court: Did you say that you’d hang the jury 
no matter what? 
Juror 12: If they do—if we cannot come to— 
The Court: No. The question is what you said to 
her. Did you say to her you would hang the jury 
no matter what? 
Juror 12: I can’t really remember that. I did say 
that if we didn’t—a person—no matter what, I 
can’t recall that exactly. 
The Court: All right. Thank you very much. You 
can wait just out there in the anteroom. 
JA5989–90. 
Defense counsel continued to oppose Juror 12’s 
dismissal. They argued that the juror’s concern was about the 
evidence, and that his comments to the courtroom deputy 
reflected a conviction that “he’s not going to agree just because 
others want him to agree.” JA5991. They also argued that 
nothing should be made of Juror 12’s failure to mention the 
comments when initially questioned by the Court, and that a 
supplemental instruction was all that was warranted given the 
early stage of the deliberations. 
The Government strongly disagreed. The Assistant 
United States Attorney argued that Juror 12 “should absolutely 
be removed” because “his demeanor ha[d] demonstrated a 
hostility . . . both to the other jurors and to the court.” JA5993. 
The Government also suggested that Juror 12’s comments that 
he would hang the jury meant that he was not participating in 
the deliberations and was ignoring the evidence and the law. 
Ruling from the bench, Judge Bartle announced: 
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I find [the deputy clerk] to be credible. I find 
[Juror 12], not to be credible. I find that [Juror 
12] did tell [the deputy clerk] that he was going 
to hang this jury no matter what. 
There have been only approximately four 
hours of deliberation. There’s no way in the 
world he could have reviewed and considered all 
of the evidence in the case and my instructions 
on the law. 
I instructed the jury to deliberate, 
meaning to discuss the evidence; obviously, to 
hold onto your honestly held beliefs, but at least 
you have to be willing to discuss the evidence 
and participate in the discussion with other 
jurors. 
Juror number 12 has delayed, disrupted, 
impeded, and obstructed the deliberative process 
and had the intent to do so. I base that having 
observed him, based on his words and his 
demeanor before me. 
He wants only to have his own voice 
heard. He has preconceived notions about the 
case. He has violated his oath as a juror. 
And I do not believe that any further 
instructions or admonitions would do any good. 
I think he’s intent on, as he said, hanging this jury 
no matter what the law is, no matter what the 
evidence is. 
Therefore, he will be excused, and I will 
replace him with the next alternate . . . . 
JA5994–95. 
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In response, defense counsel moved for a mistrial, 
which the judge promptly denied. He then informed the 
reconstituted jury that deliberations would need to start over, 
and reinstructed them on certain points of law, including that 
the verdict slip does not constitute evidence. 
Judge Bartle elaborated upon his decision to remove 
Juror 12 in two post-trial memorandum opinions. In the first, 
ruling on a media request for the sealed transcripts, he 
explained: 
Here, there is no doubt that Juror 12 intentionally 
refused to deliberate when he declared so early 
in the process that he would hang the jury no 
matter what. This finding was predicated on the 
admission of Juror 12 as reported by the court’s 
deputy clerk. The facts became clear to the court 
after hearing the credible testimony of the deputy 
clerk and the less credible testimony of Juror 12. 
The demeanor of Juror 12 before the court 
confirmed the court’s findings. 
GSA23–24. The second opinion addressed motions for bail 
pending appeal from Nicholas and Brand. GSA25. There, 
Judge Bartle explained: 
The law is well-settled that the court has 
discretion to act as it did under these 
circumstances. See United States v. Kemp, 500 
F.3d 257, 304 (3d Cir. 2007). The court, after 
taking testimony, specifically found that the 
juror, following only a few hours of deliberation, 
stated to the court’s courtroom deputy clerk that 
47 
he would hang this jury no matter what. He could 
not possibly have reviewed all of the law and 
evidence of this five-week trial at the time he 
made his remark. The court examined the deputy 
clerk and the juror under oath in the presence of 
counsel for all parties. The undersigned found 
the deputy clerk to be credible and the juror not 
to be credible. Based on the juror’s demeanor, it 
was clear he would not change his attitude and 
that his intent had been and would continue to be 
to refuse to deliberate in good faith concerning 
the law and the evidence. 
GSA32. 
After deliberating for approximately 15 hours, the jury 
returned with its verdicts on June 21, 2016, finding the 
defendants guilty on most counts. Fattah, Vederman, and 
Brand were convicted on all counts. The jury acquitted Bowser 
on sixteen counts, but found her guilty of the bribery 
conspiracy and the associated charges of bank fraud, making 
false statements to a financial institution, falsifying records, 
and money laundering (Counts 16, 19, 20, 21 and 22). The jury 
also acquitted Nicholas of wire fraud (Count 24). See Nicholas 
Supp. App. (NSA) 36. 
The following week, on June 27, the Supreme Court 
issued its opinion in McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 
2355 (2016). McDonnell provided new limitations on the 
definition of “official acts” as used in the honest services fraud 
and bribery statutes under which Fattah and Vederman had 
been convicted. Id. at 2369–72. Fattah and Vederman both 
moved to set aside their convictions. The District Court 
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“acknowledge[d] that under McDonnell our instructions to the 
jury on the meaning of official act turned out to be incomplete 
and thus erroneous.” JA103. But the Court held that “the 
incomplete and thus erroneous jury instruction on the meaning 
of official acts did not influence the verdict on the bribery 
counts” and upheld the verdict on Counts 16–18 and 22–23. 
JA107, 121. 
Fattah, Vederman, and Bowser had more success with 
their other post-verdict motions. The District Court, in a 
thoughtful opinion, granted relief under Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 29, acquitting Vederman of the RICO 
conspiracy (Count 1) and Fattah, Vederman, and Bowser of 
bank fraud, making false statements to a financial institution, 
and falsifying records (Counts 19, 20, and 21). JA37–139. 
This appeal followed.8 The defendants raise a variety of 
challenges to their convictions. All defendants but Bowser 
challenge the District Court’s decision to dismiss Juror 12. 
Fattah and Vederman argue that the District Court erred in 
upholding the jury’s verdict on the bribery and honest services 
fraud counts in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
McDonnell. Fattah, Brand and Nicholas challenge the 
sufficiency of the evidence underlying the RICO conviction. 
Several of the defendants contend the District Court erred in its 
instruction on intent and by sending the indictment out to the 
jury. There are also several evidentiary challenges.9 The 
                                              
8 Fattah, Brand, Vederman, and Nicholas each filed a timely 
notice of appeal, but Bowser did not challenge her convictions. 
9 Pursuant to Rule 28(i), “Fattah joins in the arguments of 
Herbert Vederman, Robert Brand, and Karen Nicholas to the 
extent their arguments on appeal apply to Mr. Fattah.” Fattah 
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Government cross-appeals from the District Court’s judgment 
acquitting Fattah and Vederman on Counts 19 and 20, arguing 
that the District Court erred in interpreting the definition of a 
“mortgage lending business” under 18 U.S.C. § 27. We address 
these arguments in turn. 
We hold that the District Court erred in upholding the 
jury verdict in light of McDonnell, and we will therefore 
reverse and remand for retrial on Counts 16, 17, 18, 22, and 23. 
We also hold that the District Court erred in acquitting Fattah 
and Vederman on Counts 19 and 20. Because the jury’s verdict 
was supported by the evidence, we will reinstate the 
convictions as to those counts. In all other respects, we will 
affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
                                              
Br. 19 n.69. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(i) 
provides that a defendant, “[i]n a case involving more than one 
appellant . . . may adopt by reference a part of another’s brief.” 
Here, Fattah’s decision to join fails to specify which of the 
many issues of his codefendants he believes worthy of our 
consideration. Rather, it appears that he presumes we will 
scour the record and make that determination for him. This 
type of blanket request fails to satisfy Rule 28(a)(5)’s directive 
requiring that the “appellant’s brief must contain . . . a 
statement of the issues presented for review.” Fed. R. App. P. 
28(a)(5). We conclude that expecting the appellate court to 
identify the issues to be adopted simply results in the 
abandonment and waiver of the unspecified issues. See Kost v. 
Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993). 
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III. Juror Misconduct and Dismissal of Juror 1210 
Defendant Fattah challenges the District Court’s 
decision to conduct an in camera inquiry into alleged juror 
misconduct and the ultimate dismissal of Juror 12.11 We reject 
both challenges. The record reveals credible allegations of 
juror misconduct and a sufficient basis to support the finding 
that Juror 12 violated his oath. 
A. Investigation of Alleged Juror Misconduct 
We first consider whether the District Court erred in its 
handling of the two notes from jurors. A trial court’s response 
to allegations of juror misconduct is reviewed under an abuse 
of discretion standard. United States v. Boone, 458 F.3d 321, 
326 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Resko, 3 F.3d 684, 
690 (3d Cir. 1993)). We conclude that the District Court did 
not abuse its discretion in addressing the issues raised in the 
jurors’ notes to the Court. 
Trial courts are afforded discretion in responding to 
allegations of juror misconduct. This is so because “the trial 
court is in a superior position to observe the ‘mood at trial and 
the predilections of the jury.’ ” Resko, 3 F.3d at 690 (quoting 
United States v. Chiantese, 582 F.2d 974, 980 (5th Cir. 1978)). 
But this discretion is not unlimited. Once the jury retires to 
deliberate, the confidentiality of its deliberations must be 
                                              
10 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3742(a). 
11 Vederman, Nicholas, and Brand adopt Fattah’s claim of 
reversible error concerning the dismissal of Juror 12. 
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closely guarded. An accused is constitutionally entitled to be 
tried before a jury of his peers. As ordinary citizens, jurors are 
“expected to speak, debate, argue, and make decisions the way 
ordinary people do in their daily lives.” Pena-Rodriguez v. 
Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 874 (2017) (Alito, J., dissenting). To 
protect against intrusion into a defendant’s right to be judged 
only by fellow citizens, “the door to the jury room [is] locked.” 
Id. at 875. 
In Boone, this Court considered the threshold for 
intervention by a trial judge who is presented with allegations 
of juror misconduct during the course of deliberations. 458 
F.3d at 327. We recognized that “[i]t is beyond question that 
the secrecy of deliberations is critical to the success of the jury 
system.” Id. at 329. But that secrecy abuts a competing 
interest—the jury’s proper execution of its duties. That is, “a 
juror who refuses to deliberate or who commits jury 
nullification violates the sworn jury oath and prevents the jury 
from fulfilling its constitutional role.” Id. Recognizing these 
competing interests, we declined in Boone to adopt a sweeping 
limitation on a trial court’s ability to investigate allegations of 
misconduct during jury deliberations. See id. Consistent with 
the standard applied at other stages of criminal proceedings, 
Boone teaches that “where substantial evidence of jury 
misconduct—including credible allegations of jury 
nullification or of a refusal to deliberate—arises during 
deliberations, a district court may, within its sound discretion, 
investigate the allegations through juror questioning or other 
appropriate means.” Id. 
Fattah argues that the District Court had no basis to 
question any of the jurors. Fattah Br. 20. We disagree. In 
Boone, notes from the jury presented substantial credible 
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evidence of misconduct. 458 F.3d at 330. Here, the initial note 
from the foreperson alleged that Juror 12 “refuse[d] to vote by 
the letter of the law,” would “not listen or reason with 
anybody,” and that he had “an agenda or ax to grind” with the 
Government. JA5916. The note contained allegations of both a 
refusal to deliberate and a suggestion of nullification. A refusal 
to deliberate is a violation of a juror’s oath. Boone, 458 F.3d at 
329 (citing United States v. Baker, 262 F.3d 124, 130 (2d Cir. 
2001) (“It is well-settled that jurors have a duty to 
deliberate.”)). Moreover, nullification—a juror’s refusal to 
follow the law—is a violation of the juror’s sworn oath to 
render a verdict according to the law and evidence. See United 
States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 614–18 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(discussing both “benevolent” and “shameful” examples of 
juror nullification, but “categorically reject[ing] the idea that, 
in a society committed to the rule of law, jury nullification is 
desirable or that courts may permit it to occur when it is within 
their authority to prevent”). The second jury note, signed by 
nine jurors, supported the claim of misconduct by asserting that 
Juror 12 was “incapable of making decision[s]” and was 
“constantly scream[ing]” at the other jurors. JA5916–17. We 
conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
deciding to initially question Juror 2, and subsequently, Jurors 
12, 3, 6 and 1. 
Fattah also challenges the scope of the District Court’s 
questioning. He argues that the rights to an impartial jury and 
to a unanimous verdict “would be rendered toothless if trial 
courts had free rein to question jurors during deliberations.” 
Fattah Br. 36. Indeed, we acknowledged the legitimacy of such 
a concern in Boone. Despite adopting a modest “credible 
allegations” standard for investigating misconduct, we “ke[pt] 
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in mind the importance of maintaining deliberative secrecy.” 
Boone, 458 F.3d at 329. Fattah asserts that the trial court’s 
questions to the five jurors were “intrusive and pointed” and 
“nothing like the questioning . . . approved in Boone.” Fattah 
Br. 38. But Fattah does not elaborate on how, in his view, the 
questions posed by Judge Bartle specifically intruded into 
deliberative secrecy. 
To be sure, Judge Bartle’s questioning of each juror was 
more extemporaneous than the juror questioning in Boone. 
There, the district court asked a single juror four “concise and 
carefully-worded” questions. 458 F.3d at 330. Judge Bartle’s 
voir dire of each of the five jurors took on a more 
conversational tone. We take no issue with that approach. The 
substance of the judge’s questions was limited and mirrored 
that of questions we deemed appropriate in Kemp. There, the 
court conducted three rounds of questioning. In the first round, 
each juror was asked: 
(1) “Are you personally experiencing any 
problems with how the deliberations are 
proceeding without telling us anything about the 
votes as to guilt or innocence? If yes, describe 
the problem.” (2) “Are all the jurors discussing 
the evidence or lack of evidence?” (3) “Are all 
the jurors following the court’s instructions on 
the law?” 
Kemp, 500 F.3d at 273. In the second and third rounds, each 
juror was asked: 
(1) “Is there any juror or jurors who are refusing 
to deliberate?” (2) “Is there any juror who is 
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refusing to discuss the evidence or lack of 
evidence?” (3) “Is there any juror who is 
refusing to follow the Court’s instructions?” 
Id. at 274. Here, Judge Bartle began his voir dire of each juror 
by stating that he did not wish for the juror to discuss the merits 
of the case or to reveal the content of the deliberations that had 
taken place. He asked the jurors whether screaming was 
occurring, whether the jurors were discussing the evidence, 
whether Juror 12 was placing his hands on other jurors, and 
whether Juror 12 was unwilling to follow his instructions. 
Fattah points to no specific question posed or topic 
discussed that was inappropriate, and we see little to no 
substantive difference between the questions here and those 
asked by the trial judge in Kemp. As in Kemp, “the District 
Court took care to limit its questions to appropriate matters that 
did not touch on the merits of the jury’s deliberation, and 
expressly informed each juror on multiple occasions that he or 
she should not reveal the substance of the deliberations.” Id. at 
302 (citing United States v. Edwards, 303 F.3d 606, 634 n.16 
(5th Cir. 2002)). 
Fattah also argues that once the remarks of Juror 2 and 
Juror 12 revealed no further evidence of misconduct, the court 
had no basis to question other jurors. Fattah Reply 19. Yet, our 
cases make clear that a trial court may, in its discretion, 
examine each juror. Kemp, 500 F.3d at 302 (“We have 
recognized that there are times in which individual questioning 
is the optimal way in which to root out misconduct.”). Indeed, 
“the District Court must utilize procedures that will ‘provide a 
reasonable assurance for the discovery of prejudice.’ ” Id. 
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(quoting Martin v. Warden, Huntingdon State Corr. Inst., 653 
F.2d 799, 807 (3d Cir. 1981)).12 
Judge Bartle, a very able and experienced district judge, 
was in the best position to determine what type of inquiry was 
warranted under the circumstances. We conclude that his 
questioning of the five jurors was not an abuse of discretion. 
See id. at 302. 
B. Dismissal of Juror 12 
Fattah, joined by Vederman, Brand, and Nicholas, 
strongly contends that the District Court committed reversible 
error by dismissing Juror 12. “We review the dismissal of a 
juror for cause for abuse of discretion.” Kemp, 500 F.3d at 303. 
That deferential standard compels us to affirm. 
                                              
12 Our cases do not suggest that a trial judge confronted with 
allegations that a jury’s deliberations are being obstructed by 
one of its members should always resort to interviewing jurors. 
Reinstructing the jury on its duty to deliberate will often be the 
better course at the first sign of trouble. Mere disagreement 
among jurors—even spirited disagreement—is no ground for 
intervention. Furthermore, intrusive or leading questions about 
the deliberative process may work against the twin goals of 
protecting that process and ensuring that jurors remain faithful 
to their oaths. We share the Eleventh Circuit’s preference of 
“err[ing] on the side of too little inquiry as opposed to too 
much.” United States v. Oscar, 877 F.3d 1270, 1287 (11th Cir. 
2017) (quoting United States v. Augustin, 661 F.3d 1105, 1133 
(11th Cir. 2011)). 
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Rule 23(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
permits a trial court to excuse a deliberating juror for good 
cause. See id. (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(b)). Good cause exists 
where a juror refuses to apply the law, refuses to follow the 
court’s instructions, refuses to deliberate with his or her fellow 
jurors, or demonstrates bias. See Kemp, 500 F.3d at 305–06; 
United States v. Oscar, 877 F.3d 1270, 1287 (11th Cir. 2017); 
Thomas, 116 F.3d at 617. Good cause does not exist when there 
is reasonable but sustained disagreement about how a juror 
views the evidence. The courts of appeals are emphatic that 
trial courts “may not dismiss a juror during deliberations if the 
request for discharge stems from doubts the juror harbors about 
the sufficiency of the government’s evidence.” Kemp, 500 F.3d 
at 303 (quoting United States v. Brown, 823 F.2d 591, 596 
(D.C. Cir. 1987)); see also Oscar, 877 F.3d at 1287 (same); 
United States v. Symington, 195 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 
1999); Thomas, 116 F.3d at 622. 
To reinforce a defendant’s right to a unanimous jury, we 
have adopted a high standard for juror dismissal. Kemp, 500 
F.3d at 304 & n.26. “[D]istrict courts may discharge a juror for 
bias, failure to deliberate, failure to follow the district court’s 
instructions, or jury nullification when there is no reasonable 
possibility that the allegations of misconduct stem from the 
juror’s view of the evidence.” Id. at 304 (emphasis added). This 
“no reasonable possibility” standard is “by no means lax.” Id. 
Rather, “[i]t corresponds with the burden for establishing guilt 
in a criminal trial.” Id. 
We first applied this standard in Kemp, but have not had 
occasion to do so since. There, the evidence supporting the 
district court’s removal decision was “overwhelming.” 500 
F.3d at 304. Ten jurors separately and consistently reported 
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that a juror was improperly biased, and did so only after three 
rounds of questioning and careful and correct instructions from 
the district court as to the distinction between appropriate 
skepticism and impermissible bias. Id. at 304–05; see id. at 
275–76 (district court’s instruction). The testimony also 
showed that the juror in question refused to deliberate or to 
discuss the evidence with her fellow jurors. Id. at 305. 
Whether the evidence of misconduct in this case is as 
strong as that in Kemp is beside the point. After only four hours 
of deliberations, Juror 12 stated unequivocally to the 
courtroom deputy that he was “going to hang” the jury, and 
that it would be “11 to 1 no matter what.” JA5981–82 
(emphasis added). These statements, coupled with the District 
Court’s finding that Juror 12 lacked credibility, provided a 
sufficient basis for Juror 12’s dismissal. 
As grounds for excusing Juror 12, the District Court 
found that he refused to deliberate in good faith, “delayed, 
disrupted, impeded, and obstructed the deliberative process 
and had the intent to do so,” JA5995, and that he was “intent 
on . . . hanging this jury no matter what the law is, no matter 
what the evidence is.” Id. The District Court determined from 
this that Juror 12 had violated his oath as a juror and that no 
further instructions or admonitions could rehabilitate the juror. 
Id. The District Court based these findings on personal 
observation, including Juror 12’s words and demeanor, and 
making the specific finding that Juror 12 was not credible. That 
finding is amply supported by the record. 
In United States v. Abbell, 271 F.3d 1286, 1303 (9th Cir. 
2001), the Ninth Circuit recognized that “the demeanor of the 
pertinent juror is important to juror misconduct 
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determinations” because the “juror’s motivations and 
intentions are at issue.” That court emphasized, as we do, that 
a district judge is best situated to assess the demeanor of a 
juror. Id. Here, Juror 12 stated he could not recall putting his 
hand on another juror’s shoulder, while his fellow jurors’ 
testimony was consistent on this point. Juror 12 also failed, at 
first, to recall his troubling statements to the courtroom deputy 
despite having made those statements only the previous 
afternoon. When questioned a second time and asked directly 
about the statements, he admitted to saying that he would hang 
the jury but claimed he could not “really remember” saying “no 
matter what” the day before. JA5989–90. Juror 12’s spotty 
recollection of the previous day’s events further supports the 
District Court’s finding that he was not credible. 
Fattah argues that the credibility determination was not, 
by itself, a sufficient reason to dismiss the juror because the 
record demonstrates more than a reasonable possibility that the 
complaints about his conduct stemmed from Juror 12’s own 
view of the Government’s case. Fattah Reply Br. 11; Fattah Br. 
25, 28. Fattah claims that the District Court abused its 
discretion by dismissing Juror 12 “on the basis of, in effect, six 
words the juror purportedly said to the court’s deputy after he 
was verbally attacked by other jurors.” Fattah Br. 24. 
According to Fattah, the questioning of the other jurors 
“confirmed that there were no legitimate grounds for removing 
juror 12.” Id. at 26. We conclude otherwise. 
“A district court’s finding on the question whether a 
juror has impermissibly refused to participate in the 
deliberation process is a finding of fact to which appropriate 
deference is due.” Baker, 262 F.3d at 130. While district courts 
must apply a high standard for juror dismissal, their underlying 
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findings are afforded considerable deference on appeal. Kemp, 
500 F.3d at 304 (citing Abbell, 271 F.3d at 1302–03). We will 
reverse only if the decision to dismiss a juror was “without 
factual support, or for a legally irrelevant reason.” Abbell, 271 
F.3d at 1302 (citation omitted). 
Here, the District Court had a legitimate reason for 
removing Juror 12. Refusal to deliberate constitutes good cause 
for dismissal. Although the judge did not expressly articulate 
the Kemp standard when he announced that he would dismiss 
Juror 12, he did acknowledge the “no reasonable possibility” 
standard in his discussion with counsel. The unmistakable 
import of the District Court’s statement from the bench is that 
there was no reasonable possibility that Juror 12’s 
intransigence was based on his view of the evidence. See 
Oscar, 877 F.3d at 1288 n.16. 
Fattah contends that there is no record support for the 
finding that Juror 12 said “he was going to hang this jury no 
matter what.” Fattah Br. 29. To be sure, the courtroom deputy’s 
testimony is not that Juror 12 used the words “hang this jury” 
and “no matter what” in the same sentence. She testified that 
Juror 12 first stated “I am going to hang this jury,” then later 
stated “it is going to be 11 to 1 no matter what.” JA5981–82. 
This is a distinction without a difference. Likewise, Fattah 
challenges the District Court’s finding that Juror 12 was 
determined to hang the jury “no matter what the law is” and 
“no matter what the evidence is.” Fattah Br. 29. Although there 
is no evidence that Juror 12 uttered the phrases “no matter what 
the law is” or “no matter what the evidence is,” the District 
Court was describing the import of Juror 12’s statements. This 
was not error. 
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Fattah expresses the concern that “[i]f jurors are asked 
the right questions or interrogated long enough, it would not be 
difficult for a trial court to elicit testimony from [a] majority 
[of] jurors that can be held up as evidence of a dissenting 
juror’s bias or refusal to deliberate.” Fattah Br. 22. He also 
worries that a group of jurors might have an incentive to rid 
themselves of a juror who holds a different view. Id. These are 
valid concerns—but no basis existed for such concerns in this 
case. Juror 12’s own words provided most of the support for 
his eventual dismissal. Furthermore, his statements were made 
early in the deliberations, in a complex case, before any juror 
could reasonably be expected to have reached final verdicts on 
the twenty-nine counts before the jury. 
The able District Judge did not err in finding that Juror 
12 refused to deliberate and therefore violated his oath. 
IV. The District Court’s Instructions Under McDonnell 
On appeal, Fattah and Vederman renew their challenge 
to the jury instructions given on Counts 3, 16, 17, 18, 22, and 
23, concerning the meaning of the term “official act” as used 
in the bribery statute (pursuant to which both were convicted) 
and the honest services fraud statute (pursuant to which Fattah 
alone was convicted). 
In light of the Supreme Court’s opinion in McDonnell 
v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016), released the week 
after the jury verdict, the District Court conceded that its 
instructions were incomplete and erroneous, at least as to 
Counts 16–18. Nevertheless, the District Court held that the 
erroneous jury instructions had not influenced the verdict on 
the bribery counts, and declined to set aside Fattah and 
61 
Vederman’s convictions. As to Counts 16–18 and 22–23, we 
disagree, and will reverse the District Court’s judgment. The 
District Court’s judgment with respect to Count 3, which did 
not involve Vederman, will be affirmed. JA78–79. 
A. The McDonnell Framework 
In McDonnell, the Supreme Court interpreted the term 
“official act” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3). 136 S. Ct. at 
2368. The statute defines an “official act” as “any decision or 
action on any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or 
controversy, which may at any time be pending, or which may 
by law be brought before any public official, in such official’s 
official capacity, or in such official’s place of trust or profit.” 
18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3). The McDonnell Court distilled this 
definition into two requirements: 
First, the Government must identify a “question, 
matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy” 
that “may at any time be pending” or “may by 
law be brought” before a public official. Second, 
the Government must prove that the public 
official made a decision or took an action “on” 
that question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding, or 
controversy, or agreed to do so. 
136 S. Ct. at 2368. Applying this two-step test to Governor 
Robert McDonnell’s convictions, the Supreme Court 
concluded that “the jury was not correctly instructed on the 
meaning of ‘official act,’ ” and as a result, “may have convicted 
Governor McDonnell for conduct that is not unlawful.” Id. at 
2375. Given that uncertainty, the Court “[could not] conclude 
that the errors in the jury instructions were ‘harmless beyond a 
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reasonable doubt.’ ” Id. (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 
U.S. 1, 16 (1999)). The Supreme Court, therefore, vacated 
Governor McDonnell’s convictions. Id. 
McDonnell lays out a clear path for the Government to 
follow in proving that an accused has performed an “official 
act.” First, the Government must “identify a ‘question, matter, 
cause, suit, proceeding or controversy’ that ‘may at any time 
be pending’ or ‘may by law be brought’ before a public 
official.” 136 S. Ct. at 2368 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3)). 
This first step is divided into two sub-components. In Step 
1(A), the Government must “identify a ‘question, matter, 
cause, suit, proceeding or controversy.’ ” Id. Step 1(B) then 
clarifies that the identified “question, matter, cause, suit, 
proceeding or controversy” be one that “ ‘may at any time be 
pending’ or ‘may by law be brought’ before a public official.” 
Id. 
Under Step 1(A), a “question, matter, cause, suit, 
proceeding or controversy” must be “a formal exercise of 
governmental power that is similar in nature to a lawsuit before 
a court, a determination before an agency, or a hearing before 
a committee.” Id. at 2372. Importantly, “a typical meeting, 
telephone call, or event arranged by a public official” does not 
qualify as such a formal exercise of governmental power. Id. at 
2368. 
Step 1(B) then requires us to ask whether the qualifying 
“question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy” was 
one that “ ‘may at any time be pending’ or ‘may by law be 
brought’ before a public official.” Id. As the McDonnell Court 
clarified, “ ‘[p]ending’ and ‘may by law be brought’ suggest 
something that is relatively circumscribed—the kind of thing 
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that can be put on an agenda, tracked for progress, and then 
checked off as complete.” Id. at 2369; accord United States v. 
Repak, 852 F.3d 230, 252 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting McDonnell, 
136 S. Ct. at 2369). By contrast, matters described at a high 
level of generality—for example, “[e]conomic development,” 
“justice,” and “national security”—are not sufficiently 
“focused and concrete.” McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2369. 
In McDonnell, the Court concluded that at least three 
questions or matters identified by the Fourth Circuit were 
sufficiently focused: 
(1) whether researchers at any of Virginia’s state 
universities would initiate a study of [a drug]; 
(2) whether the state-created Tobacco 
Indemnification and Community Revitalization 
Commission would allocate grant money for the 
study of [a chemical compound]; and 
(3) whether the health insurance plan for state 
employees in Virginia would include [a specific 
drug] as a covered drug. 
Id. at 2370 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting United States 
v. McDonnell, 792 F.3d 478, 515–16 (4th Cir. 2015)). We 
provided guidance in the form of a fourth example in Repak, 
when we held that a redevelopment authority’s awarding of 
contracts was “a concrete determination made by the 
[redevelopment authority’s] Board of Directors.” 852 F.3d at 
253. 
Step 2 requires the Government to prove that the public 
official made a “decision” or took “an action” on the identified 
“question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy.” 
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McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2368. The McDonnell Court 
explained: 
Setting up a meeting, hosting an event, or calling 
an official (or agreeing to do so) merely to talk 
about a research study or to gather additional 
information . . . does not qualify as a decision or 
action on the pending question of whether to 
initiate the study. Simply expressing support for 
the research study at a meeting, event, or call—
or sending a subordinate to such a meeting, 
event, or call—similarly does not qualify as a 
decision or action on the study, as long as the 
public official does not intend to exert pressure 
on another official or provide advice, knowing or 
intending such advice to form the basis for an 
“official act.” 
Id. at 2371. The Court further clarified: 
If an official sets up a meeting, hosts an event, or 
makes a phone call on a question or matter that 
is or could be pending before another official, 
that could serve as evidence of an agreement to 
take an official act. A jury could conclude, for 
example, that the official was attempting to 
pressure or advise another official on a pending 
matter. And if the official agreed to exert that 
pressure or give that advice in exchange for a 
thing of value, that would be illegal. 
Id. 
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Here, Fattah was charged with engaging in three 
categories of official acts, which we analyze in accordance 
with the McDonnell framework. In Counts 16–18 and 22–23, 
Fattah is alleged to have set up a meeting between Vederman 
and the U.S. Trade Representative, attempted to secure 
Vederman an ambassadorship, and hired Vederman’s 
girlfriend, all in return for a course of conduct wherein 
Vederman provided things of value to Fattah. 
In this case, as in McDonnell, the jury instructions were 
erroneous. We conclude that the first category of the charged 
acts—setting up a meeting between Vederman and the U.S. 
Trade Representative—is not unlawful, and that the second 
category—attempting to secure Vederman an 
ambassadorship—requires reconsideration by a properly 
instructed jury. The third charged act—hiring Vederman’s 
girlfriend—is clearly an official act. But because we cannot 
isolate the jury’s consideration of the hiring from the first two 
categories of charged acts, we must reverse and remand the 
judgment of the District Court. 
B. The Kirk Meeting 
We turn first to Fattah’s scheduling of a meeting 
between Vederman and the U.S. Trade Representative, Ron 
Kirk. Under McDonnell, “setting up a meeting . . . does not, 
standing alone, qualify as an ‘official act.’ ” 136 S. Ct. at 2368. 
Fattah’s setting up the meeting between Vederman and Kirk 
was therefore not an official act, a concession implicit in the 
Government’s opening brief. See Gov’t Br. 32 (failing to 
mention the Kirk meeting as one of the “two categories” of 
allegedly “official acts”). But the jury was not properly 
instructed on this point. Without the benefit of the principles 
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laid down in McDonnell, the jury was free to conclude that 
arranging the Kirk meeting was an official act—and it may 
have done so. The District Court’s erroneous jury instructions, 
therefore, cannot survive harmless error review. 
In a footnote in its brief to this Court, the Government 
argues that evidence about the Kirk meeting was offered only 
“because it established the strength of Vederman’s desire to be 
an ambassador” and not because the Government was 
attempting to establish the meeting as an independent official 
act. Id. at79–80 n.6. But the record undercuts the 
Government’s post hoc justification. 
The indictment, provided to the jury in redacted form 
for use in its deliberations, lists Fattah’s setting up the Kirk 
meeting as an official act under the heading “FATTAH’s 
Official Acts for VEDERMAN.” JA494. Under this heading 
are three distinct subheadings: (1) “The Pursuit of an 
Ambassadorship,” (2) “The Pursuit of Another Executive 
Branch Position,” and (3) “Hiring the Lobbyist’s Girlfriend to 
the Congressional Staff.” JA494–95. The second subheading, 
“The Pursuit of Another Executive Branch Position,” describes 
the arrangement of the Kirk meeting. Quite clearly, then, this 
three-part structure demonstrates that setting up the Kirk 
meeting was one of three distinct categories of official acts 
alleged by the Government. 
Although there is some support for the Government’s 
argument that evidence of the Kirk meeting was presented at 
trial only to establish the extent of Vederman’s interest in 
becoming an ambassador, JA827, 852–53 (mentioning the 
Kirk meeting in close proximity to references to Fattah’s 
attempts to secure Vederman an ambassadorship), it is 
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undermined by language in the redacted indictment itself, and 
by the way in which the Government presented its case at trial 
as a “pattern” of connected acts. 
The redacted indictment, for example, refers to the Kirk 
meeting as “The Pursuit of Another Executive Branch 
Position.” JA495 (emphasis added). The use of the word 
“Another” strongly suggests that evidence about the Kirk 
meeting was not merely evidence of Fattah’s attempt to secure 
Vederman an ambassadorship, but was also evidence of a 
separate and distinct attempt to secure Vederman a position on 
a federal trade-related commission. The redacted indictment 
also notes that “[i]n or around May 2011, with little progress 
made on securing an ambassadorship for VEDERMAN, 
FATTAH turned towards obtaining for VEDERMAN an 
appointment in the Executive Branch to a federal trade 
commission.” Id. (emphasis added). The words “turned 
towards,” taken literally, clearly convey that arranging the Kirk 
meeting was presented as distinct from Fattah’s efforts to 
secure Vederman an ambassadorship. 
The District Court denied Fattah and Vederman a new 
trial on Counts 17 and 18, referring to evidence of the Kirk 
meeting as “de minimis” and noting that “Kirk’s testimony 
during this lengthy trial lasted a mere sixteen minutes.” JA97 
n.14. In the District Court’s view, evidence of the Kirk meeting 
“played no role in the outcome” of the case. Id. Considering 
the record in light of McDonnell, we are not so sure. 
Although it is possible that evidence of the Kirk meeting 
played a minor role at trial when compared to the other acts on 
which the Government presented evidence, the redacted 
indictment suggests that the Kirk meeting was a significant part 
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of the Government’s case. The indictment dedicates five 
paragraphs to describing the Kirk meeting, but just three 
paragraphs to describing the hiring of Vederman’s girlfriend—
a hiring that, as we explain below, is clearly an official act. 
JA495–96. While neither the number of minutes used at trial 
nor the number of paragraphs contained in an indictment is a 
dispositive unit of measurement for determining the 
significance of evidence, we conclude that the District Court’s 
erroneous jury instructions pertaining to the Kirk meeting were 
not harmless. 
We conclude, in accordance with McDonnell, that 
Fattah’s arranging a meeting between Vederman and the U.S. 
Trade Representative was not itself an official act. Because the 
jury may have convicted Fattah for conduct that is not 
unlawful, we cannot conclude that the error in the jury 
instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and we 
must vacate and remand the convictions of Fattah and 
Vederman as to Counts 16, 17, 18, 22 and 23. 
C. Fattah’s Efforts to Secure Vederman an 
Ambassadorship 
The nature of Fattah’s efforts to secure Vederman an 
ambassadorship is less clear, and presents a closer question 
than the Kirk meeting. We ultimately conclude that the 
question warrants remand so that it may be answered by a 
properly instructed jury. On remand, the jury must decide 
whether Fattah’s conduct constituted a “decision” or “action” 
under Step 2 of the McDonnell analysis. 
At the outset, it is clear to us that, under Steps 1(A) and 
1(B), a formal appointment of Vederman as an ambassador 
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would qualify as a “matter” that “may at any time be pending” 
before a public official. The formal appointment of a particular 
person (Vederman), to a specific position (an ambassadorship), 
constitutes a matter that is sufficiently focused and concrete. 
The formal appointment of an ambassador is a matter that is 
“pending” before the President—the constitutional actor 
charged with nominating ambassadors—as well Senators, who 
are charged with confirming the President’s ambassadorial 
nominations. U.S. Const. art. II § 2 (“[H]e shall nominate, and 
by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall 
appoint Ambassadors . . . .”). It is beyond cavil that the formal 
appointment of an ambassador satisfies both sub-components 
of McDonnell’s Step 1. 
Turning to Step 2, we consider whether Fattah’s efforts 
to secure Vederman an ambassadorship qualify as making a 
“decision” or taking “an action” on the identified “matter” of 
appointment. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2368. Although those 
efforts—three emails, two letters, and one phone call—do not 
themselves qualify as a “question, matter, cause, suit, 
proceeding, or controversy” under McDonnell’s Step 1, they 
may nonetheless qualify as the making of a “decision” or 
taking “an action” on the identified matter of appointment. Id. 
McDonnell’s Step 2 requires us to determine whether 
Fattah’s efforts qualify as permissible attempts to “express[] 
support,” or impermissible attempts “to pressure or advise 
another official on a pending matter.” Id. at 2371. At trial, the 
jury was not instructed that they had to place Fattah’s efforts 
on one side or the other of this divide. The jury might even 
have thought they were permitted to find Fattah’s efforts—
three emails, two letters, and one phone call—to themselves be 
official acts, rather than a “decision” or “action” on the 
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properly identified matter of appointment. Such a 
determination would have been contrary to the dictates of 
McDonnell. 
Faced with such uncertainty, we cannot assume the jury 
verdict was proper. Although the jury might not have 
concluded that Fattah’s efforts were themselves official acts, 
and although the jury might not have concluded that those 
efforts crossed the line into impermissible attempts “to 
pressure or advise,” we are unable to conclude that the jury 
necessarily did so. Nor can we, on the cold record before us, 
determine whether Fattah’s efforts to secure Vederman an 
ambassadorship crossed the line. Determining, for example, 
just how forceful a strongly worded letter of recommendation 
must be before it becomes impermissible “pressure or advice” 
is a fact-intensive inquiry that falls within the domain of a 
properly instructed jury. Should the Government elect to retry 
these counts after remand, the finder of fact will need to decide 
whether Fattah’s efforts constituted permissible attempts to 
“express[] support,” or impermissible attempts “to pressure or 
advise another official on a pending matter.” Id. 
D. The Zionts Hiring 
The third group of acts charged in the Fattah–Vederman 
scheme involves Fattah’s decision to hire Vederman’s 
girlfriend, Alexandra Zionts, as a congressional staffer. We 
conclude that the hiring was an official act. A brief analysis of 
McDonnell’s two steps suffices to show why this is so. 
Here, under McDonnell’s Step 1(A), the relevant 
“matter” is the decision to hire Zionts. Step 1(B) of the analysis 
is satisfied because the hiring decision was “pending” before 
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Fattah himself. And that hiring was “focused and concrete,” 
“within the specific duties of an official’s position—the 
function conferred by the authority of his office.” Id. at 2369. 
Finally, McDonnell’s Step 2 requires that the “Government . . . 
prove that the public official made a decision or took an action 
‘on’ [the identified] question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding, 
or controversy, or agreed to do so.” Id. at 2368. Fattah’s 
decision to hire Zionts clearly satisfies that requirement. We 
therefore conclude that the hiring of Zionts was an official act 
under McDonnell. 
Vederman concedes that the Zionts hiring was an 
official act. Oral Argument Transcript at 5–6. Fattah, for his 
part, maintains that “hiring someone for a routine, part-time, 
short-term position falls well outside [the] definition [of 
‘official act’] and is nothing like a lawsuit, agency 
determination, or committee hearing, even if each shares the 
happenstance that federal funds will be used.” Fattah Reply Br. 
25. 
Fattah’s argument lacks traction. Official acts need not 
be momentous decisions—or even notable ones. Judges, for 
example, make “routine” evidentiary rulings every day, and yet 
it is beyond question that those rulings are official acts. In the 
realm of official acts, it is of no moment that Zionts provided 
only “part-time, short term” labor. When a public official hires 
an employee to work in his government office, he has engaged 
in an official act. 
* * * 
If we could conclude that the Zionts hiring was the only 
category of actions that the jury relied on when it found that 
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Fattah performed an official act under Counts 16–18 and 22–
23, remand would not be necessary. But, as we have explained, 
we cannot rule out that the jury erroneously convicted Fattah 
and Vederman based on other actions that were not official acts 
under McDonnell.13 
The Government argues that because the Zionts hiring 
was an official act, the effect of the erroneous jury instructions 
could be no more than harmless. The jury’s verdict, the 
Government contends, permits us to deduce that the jury 
necessarily concluded the Zionts hiring was an official act, and 
that this conclusion alone supported Fattah’s and Vederman’s 
convictions as to Counts 16–18 and 22–23—regardless of 
whether the jury erroneously found any unofficial acts to be 
official acts. We disagree. 
Fattah and Vederman objected to the definition of 
“official act” at trial. We thus apply the harmless error standard 
                                              
13 More specifically, the incomplete, and therefore erroneous, 
instructions could have led the jury to commit at least one of 
three mistakes. First, the jury could have improperly convicted 
Vederman and Fattah based on the Kirk meeting alone, or 
misunderstood the Kirk meeting to be a necessary component 
of an impermissible “pattern” of official acts. Second, the jury 
might have concluded that Fattah’s efforts to secure Vederman 
an ambassadorship were themselves official acts. Third, the 
jury might have concluded that Fattah’s efforts to secure 
Vederman an ambassadorship were merely attempts to 
“express[] support,” rather than to “exert pressure . . . or 
provide advice,” but nonetheless erroneously concluded that 
those expressions of support were official acts. McDonnell, 
136 S. Ct. at 2371. 
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of review. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2375. The Government 
argues that because the jury convicted Fattah and Vederman of 
illegally laundering the proceeds of a “scheme to commit 
bribery” under Count 23, the jury found that the scheme must 
have encompassed only the Zionts hiring. JA531.That would 
mean that the jury did not conclude that the “scheme to commit 
bribery” included any acts that McDonnell now makes clear 
were unofficial. Yet the redacted indictment, jury instructions, 
and the fact that the Government presented its case under a 
“pattern” theory at trial compel us to reject the Government’s 
argument. 
The very first sentence under Count 23 of the redacted 
indictment incorporates all three categories of “Overt Acts” 
contained within paragraphs “58 through 95 of Count One.”14 
All three of these categories fall under a general heading within 
the redacted indictment titled “The Bribery and Fraud Scheme 
[redacted].” JA494. The jury had before it instructions for 
Count 23 which referred to “the alleged bribery scheme 
involving an $18,000 payment,” JA448 (emphasis added), and 
the redacted indictment which referred to “a scheme to commit 
bribery,” JA531 (emphasis added). The parallel language could 
well lead a rational jury to conclude that the relevant “scheme” 
included all three categories of acts listed under the general 
heading: “The Bribery and Fraud Scheme [redacted].” JA494 
(emphasis added). 
                                              
14 JA531. Paragraphs 58 through 95 of Count 1 refer to the 
three categories of allegedly official acts discussed above: 
(1) “The Pursuit of an Ambassadorship,” (2) “The Pursuit of 
Another Executive Branch Position,” and (3) the “Hiring of the 
Lobbyist’s Girlfriend to the Congressional Staff.” JA494–95. 
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Like the redacted indictment and jury instructions, the 
Government’s trial arguments referred to patterns and a course 
of conduct, and stressed that the jury need not connect specific 
payments to particular official acts. In its closing argument to 
the jury, the Government stated that the alleged “scheme took 
place over a period of several years. Over and over again 
you’re going to see the same pattern.” JA5383 (emphasis 
added). Then, in its rebuttal argument, the Government went 
out of its way to explicitly distinguish its “pattern” theory from 
an alternative theory that would have directly connected 
individual payments to individual acts. As the prosecutor 
argued to the jury: 
Ms. Recker appears to argue that each thing of 
value must coincide with some specific official 
act, but that is not the law and that is not what 
Judge Bartle is going to instruct you. Instead 
what he will tell you is that the government is not 
required to prove that Vederman intended to 
influence Fattah to perform a set number of 
official acts in return for things of value so long 
as the evidence shows a course of conduct of 
giving things of value, things of value to Fattah 
in exchange for a pattern of official acts 
favorable to Vederman. In other words a stream 
of benefits. These for those, not this for that. 
JA5715–16 (emphases added). In closing to the jury, the 
Government made several other references to this “pattern” 
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theory,15 and the District Court referred to this “pattern” theory 
in its instructions to the jury. As Judge Bartle instructed: 
[I]t is not necessary for the government to prove 
that a defendant intended to induce a public 
official to perform a number of official acts in 
return for things of value. 
So as long as the evidence shows a course 
of conduct of giving things of value to a public 
official in exchange for a pattern of official acts 
favorable to the giver. 
JA5833–34 (emphasis added). On appeal, the Government 
changes course, asking us to assume that the jury ignored these 
repeated references to a “pattern of official acts” and instead 
considered the Zionts hiring and Vederman’s $18,000 payment 
to Fattah as an isolated quid pro quo. This is an invitation to 
speculate, and we decline to do so.16 The jury began its 
                                              
15 See, e.g., JA5389 (“And the exchange of an official act for a 
thing of value is called a bribe. There’s the pattern. Fattah 
needs money, Vederman gets an official act.”); JA 5393 
(“That’s why you see the pattern over and over again. Fattah 
needs money, Vederman gets an official act.”); JA5400 (“The 
same pattern we saw over and over again. Fattah needs money, 
Vederman gets an official act.”); JA5409 (“[Y]ou know that 
these were bribes because of the pattern you saw over and over 
and over again. Fattah needs money, Vederman gets an official 
act, that makes these things a bribe.”). 
16 Providing some support to the Government’s ultimately 
unconvincing argument that the jury considered the Zionts 
hiring and $18,000 payment in isolation, we note that the 
redacted indictment does mention those two events side-by-
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deliberations accompanied by a copy of the redacted 
indictment which alleged a pattern of official acts, consisting 
of any combination of three categories of acts: pursuing an 
ambassadorship, arranging the Kirk meeting, and hiring 
Zionts. In light of the erroneous instructions, and because only 
one category clearly qualifies as an “official act,” the jury’s 
deliberations were fraught with the potential for McDonnell 
error. We will vacate the convictions of Fattah and Vederman 
as to Counts 16, 17, 18, 22, and 23, and remand to the District 
Court. 
E. Vederman’s Sufficiency Challenge to Counts 16–18 and 
22–23 
Vederman argues that there is insufficient evidence to 
support a conviction, even if a jury were properly instructed 
under McDonnell. Specifically, Vederman argues that there is 
insufficient evidence to convict him and Fattah, after remand, 
                                              
side in paragraph 78 of the indictment’s Part V. JA497 (“On 
January 13, 2012, VEDERMAN wired $18,000 to FATTAH, 
and six days later, on January 19, 2012, BOWSER emailed 
VEDERMAN’s girlfriend, A.Z., welcoming her as a new 
employee to FATTAH’s Congressional Staff.”). But although 
paragraph 78 mentions the $18,000 wire transfer and the Zionts 
hiring in the same breath, paragraph 78 does not instruct the 
jury to connect these two events apart from the rest of the 
evidence presented at trial. In light of the other instructions and 
arguments indicating that the jury should not consider the 
Zionts hiring in isolation, but instead should consider the hiring 
as one part of a three-part scheme, paragraph 78 is not 
sufficient to avoid a reversal and remand on the convictions of 
Fattah and Vederman as to Counts 16–18 and 22–23. 
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on Counts 16–18 and 22–23 because “[a]t least seven of the 
eight alleged ‘official acts’ were, as a matter of law, not official 
at all.” Vederman Br. 35. As to the single act that Vederman 
implicitly concedes to be an official act—the Zionts hiring—
Vederman argues that “[t]he only thing that even arguably 
associates” the Zionts hiring with Vederman was its timing in 
relation to Vederman’s sham purchase of the Fattahs’ Porsche. 
Id. According to Vederman, “the undisputed chronology 
precludes any inference that Vederman conferred this benefit 
on his friend as an illegal bribe.” Id. (emphasis omitted). 
Vederman is wrong. Sufficient evidence was produced at trial 
to have allowed a properly-instructed jury to convict Fattah and 
Vederman of Counts 16–18 and 22–23. 
To begin with, even if the Zionts hiring had been the 
sole official act to survive this Court’s interpretation of 
McDonnell, there would still be sufficient evidence to convict 
Fattah and Vederman. Zionts did not receive written notice of 
her official hiring until six days after the sham Porsche 
purchase. Moreover, the jury would not be restricted to 
considering the chronology of the sham purchase alone. It 
would be free to consider Vederman’s entire course of conduct. 
Under the general heading “VEDERMAN’S Payments and 
Things of Value to FATTAH,” the redacted indictment not 
only refers to the $18,000 wire transaction from Vederman to 
Fattah as part of the sham Porsche purchase, but also to 
Vederman’s $3,000 payment for the college tuition of Simone 
Muller, Fattah’s live-in au pair, as well as thousands of dollars 
in payments made by Vederman for Chip Fattah’s college 
tuition. JA496–97. 
And the Zionts hiring is not the only act to survive our 
application of McDonnell. As we explained, a jury could find 
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that Fattah’s efforts to secure Vederman an ambassadorship—
three emails, two letters, and a phone call—were an 
impermissible attempt to “pressure or advise” President 
Obama, Senator Casey, or both men.17 This means that a 
properly instructed jury on remand, presented with evidence of 
Fattah’s efforts to secure an ambassadorship for Vederman and 
                                              
17 Although Fattah’s efforts to secure Vederman an 
ambassadorship present a jury question that is not for us to 
answer on appeal, we note that not one of these efforts alone 
could qualify as an official act itself. See McDonnell, 136 S. 
Ct. at 2372 (“Setting up a meeting, talking to another official, 
or organizing an event (or agreeing to do so)—without more—
does not fit that definition of ‘official act.’ ”). The relevant 
question for a jury to consider on remand, then, is whether 
these actions constituted “a ‘decision or action’ on a different 
question or matter”—to wit, the formal appointment of an 
ambassador. Id. at 2369 (emphasis omitted). 
Even though the emails, letters, and phone call are not, 
individually, official acts, it will be for a jury to decide if 
Fattah’s efforts to secure an ambassadorship for Vederman 
crossed the line from permissible “support” to impermissible 
“pressure or advice.” While we express doubt that some of 
Fattah’s efforts concerning the ambassadorship are, when 
considered in isolation, enough to cross that line, a properly 
instructed jury considering all of the facts in context might 
nonetheless conclude that other efforts—such as a hand-
delivered letter to the President of the United States—indeed 
crossed that line. Further, a jury might find that in the 
aggregate, three emails, two letters, and a phone call crossed 
the line and therefore constituted a “decision or action” on the 
identified matter of appointment. 
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evidence of the Zionts hiring, could find more than a single 
official act. 
F. Blue Guardians 
In addition to the charges arising from his dealings with 
Vederman, Fattah was charged in Count 3 with participating in 
a scheme with Lindenfeld to funnel money to a fraudulent 
nonprofit organization. In connection with this scheme, Fattah 
was convicted of conspiring to commit honest services fraud. 
Fattah owed Lindenfeld nearly $100,000 for work 
performed on Fattah’s 2007 mayoral campaign. In lieu of 
repayment, Fattah suggested that Lindenfeld create an entity, 
later named Blue Guardians, to which Fattah would direct 
$15,000,000 in public funds by using his position as a member 
of the House Committee on Appropriations. Nothing in 
McDonnell requires us to upset Fattah’s conviction on Count 
3. 
Step 1(A) of our McDonnell analysis requires the 
Government to “identify a ‘question, matter, cause, suit, 
proceeding or controversy.’ ” 136 S. Ct. at 2368. Here, the 
“matter” is the appropriation of millions of dollars in public 
funds. See Repak, 852 F.3d at 253–54 (holding the awarding of 
redevelopment funds to be an official act). In particular, it was 
Fattah’s promise to perform this official act that was unlawful. 
As McDonnell makes clear: 
[A] public official is not required to actually 
make a decision or take an action on a “question, 
matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy”; 
it is enough that the official agree to do so. The 
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agreement need not be explicit, and the public 
official need not specify the means that he will 
use to perform his end of the bargain. 
136 S. Ct. at 2370–71 (internal citations omitted). That Fattah 
took steps to actually carry out his promise (e.g., by drafting 
and sending a formal appropriations request on official 
congressional letterhead) is evidence of his illegal promise. See 
id. at 2371. 
Step 1(B) requires the Government to establish that the 
“ ‘question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy’ . . . 
‘may at any time be pending’ or ‘may by law be brought’ 
before a public official.” McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2368. 
Appropriating public funds was not only a matter that was 
pending before Fattah as a member of the Appropriations 
Committee, it was also a matter that was pending before the 
Chairman and Ranking Member of an Appropriations 
Subcommittee to whom Fattah ultimately sent a formal written 
request. See id. at 2369 (“[T]he matter may be pending either 
before the public official who is performing the official act, or 
before another public official.”). Appropriating millions of 
dollars in response to the Blue Guardians request is “focused 
and concrete,” and “the kind of thing that can be put on an 
agenda, tracked for progress, and then checked off as 
complete.” Id. 
Given Fattah’s membership on the Appropriations 
Committee, this was “something within the specific duties of 
an official’s position—the function conferred by the authority 
of his office.” Id. Even if we were to assume, against all reason, 
that an appropriation is not “something within the specific 
duties” of either Fattah or the Chairman or Ranking Member 
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of an Appropriations Subcommittee, Fattah’s formal request 
for an appropriation was something that Fattah had the 
authority to do. Like the Executive Director in Repak, who 
lacked authority himself to award redevelopment funds but 
could request such funds from the Board, Fattah used his 
position as a Congressman to formally request appropriations 
for the Blue Guardians. 852 F.3d at 254 (“Repak had the power 
to, and indeed did, make recommendations to the 
[redevelopment authority. 
Step 2 of McDonnell requires the Government to “prove 
that the public official made a decision or took an action ‘on’ 
that question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding, or controversy, 
or agreed to do so.” 136 S. Ct. at 2368 (emphasis added). Here, 
Fattah agreed to request an appropriation for a bogus purpose. 
Unlike Fattah’s letters, emails, and phone call seeking an 
ambassadorship for Vederman, there is no potential for the jury 
to have made a mistake when it found Fattah’s Blue Guardians 
promise unlawful. 
Fattah argues that the Government presented “[n]o 
evidence . . . that would have allowed [the jury] to conclude 
that [he] made a decision or took an action, or could have done 
so, on the question whether Blue Guardians would receive a 
$15 million federal grant.” Fattah Br. 46. This argument misses 
the point. It was Fattah’s agreement to engage in the official 
act of formally requesting the appropriation that was illegal. 
See McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2371. 
Lindenfeld’s trial testimony provided sufficient 
evidence of Fattah’s illegal agreement. JA1694–96, 1954. 
Fattah’s letter provided additional evidence from which the 
jury could have concluded that Fattah illegally agreed to 
82 
perform an official act.18 In short, the agreement itself was 
illegal, and the Government provided sufficient evidence for 
the jury to conclude that the illegal agreement took place. 
The Government’s evidence in support of the Blue 
Guardians scheme meets the requirements of McDonnell, and 
the Count 3 verdict will stand. 
V. Sufficiency of the Evidence for the RICO Conspiracy 
Conviction 
The jury found Fattah, Vederman, Brand, and Nicholas 
guilty of the RICO conspiracy charged in Count 1 of the 
indictment, but acquitted Bowser. Vederman filed a post-
verdict motion, and the District Court overturned his RICO 
conspiracy conviction. 
On appeal, Fattah, Brand, and Nicholas challenge the 
sufficiency of the evidence supporting their RICO conspiracy 
convictions. We “review[] the sufficiency of the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the government and must credit all 
available inferences in favor of the government.” United States 
v. Riddick, 156 F.3d 505, 509 (3d Cir. 1998). If a rational juror 
could have found the elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt, we must sustain the verdict. United States v. 
Cartwright, 359 F.3d 281, 286 (3d Cir. 2004), abrogated on 
                                              
18 Despite Fattah’s protestation to the contrary, there is 
evidence that Fattah took steps to carry out his official act. 
JA6432–33 (Letter from Congressman Fattah to House 
Appropriations Subcommittee members “request[ing] funding 
and support for the following projects and programs of critical 
importance,” including $3,000,000 for “Blue Guardians”). 
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other grounds by United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 
F.3d 418 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc). 
The indictment charged a RICO conspiracy in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), which makes it “unlawful for any 
person to conspire to violate” § 1962(c). Section 1962(c) 
provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person . . . associated 
with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities 
of which affect, interstate . . . commerce, to 
conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in 
the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a 
pattern of racketeering activity . . . . 
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). 
In Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52 (1997), the 
defendant was convicted of a § 1962(d) RICO conspiracy, but 
a jury acquitted him of the substantive RICO offense under 
§ 1962(c). Id. at 55. The Supreme Court rejected Salinas’s 
contention that his conviction had to be set aside because he 
had neither committed nor agreed to commit the two predicate 
acts required for the § 1962(c) offense. Id. at 66. The Court 
declared that liability for a RICO conspiracy under § 1962(d), 
“unlike the general conspiracy provision applicable to federal 
crimes,” does not require proof of an overt act. Id. at 63. A 
conspiracy may be found, the Court explained, “even if a 
conspirator does not agree to commit or facilitate each and 
every part of the substantive offense. The partners in the 
criminal plan must agree to pursue the same criminal objective 
and may divide up the work, yet each is responsible for the acts 
of each other.” Id. at 63–64 (citations omitted). This means 
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that, if a plan “calls for some conspirators to perpetrate the 
crime and others to provide support, the supporters are as guilty 
as the perpetrators.” Id. at 64. Thus, opting into and 
participating in a conspiracy may result in criminal liability for 
the acts of one’s co-conspirators. Smith v. Berg, 247 F.3d 532, 
537 (3d Cir. 2001). 
Accordingly, liability for a RICO conspiracy may be 
found where the conspirator intended to “further an endeavor 
which, if completed, would satisfy all of the elements of a 
substantive criminal offense, but it suffices that he adopt the 
goal of furthering or facilitating the criminal endeavor.” 
Salinas, 522 U.S. at 65. Because the substantive criminal 
offense here was conducting a § 1962(c) enterprise, the 
government had to prove: 
(1) that two or more persons agreed to conduct 
or to participate, directly or indirectly, in the 
conduct of an enterprise’s affairs through a 
pattern of racketeering activity; (2) that the 
defendant was a party to or member of that 
agreement; and (3) that the defendant joined the 
agreement or conspiracy knowing of its 
objective to conduct or participate, directly or 
indirectly, in the conduct of an enterprise’s 
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. 
United States v. John-Baptiste, 747 F.3d 186, 207 (3d Cir. 
2014). 
In United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981), the 
Supreme Court instructed that an enterprise is a “group of 
persons associated together for a common purpose of engaging 
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in a course of conduct.” Id. at 583. The government can prove 
an enterprise “by evidence of an ongoing organization, formal 
or informal, and by evidence that the various associates 
function as a continuing unit.” Id. In Boyle v. United States, 
556 U.S. 938 (2009), the Supreme Court established that an 
“association-in-fact enterprise must have at least three 
structural features: a purpose, relationships among those 
associated with the enterprise, and longevity sufficient to 
permit these associates to pursue the enterprise’s purpose.” Id. 
at 946. The structure necessary for a § 1962(c) enterprise is not 
complex. Boyle explained that an enterprise 
need not have a hierarchical structure or a “chain 
of command”; decisions may be made on an ad 
hoc basis and by any number of methods—by 
majority vote, consensus, a show of strength, etc. 
Members of the group need not have fixed roles; 
different members may perform different roles at 
different times. The group need not have a name, 
regular meetings, dues, [or] established rules and 
regulations . . . .While the group must function 
as a continuing unit and remain in existence long 
enough to pursue a course of conduct, nothing in 
RICO exempts an enterprise whose associates 
engage in spurts of activity punctuated by 
periods of quiescence. 
Id. at 948. 
Another element of a substantive § 1962(c) RICO 
enterprise is that the enterprise must conduct its affairs through 
a pattern of racketeering activity. Section 1961 defines 
racketeering activity to include various criminal offenses, 
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including wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1344, and obstruction of 
justice, 18 U.S.C. § 1511. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). A pattern 
of such activity “requires at least two acts of racketeering 
activity.” Id. § 1961(5). The racketeering predicates may 
establish a pattern if they “related and . . . amounted to, or 
threatened the likelihood of, continued criminal activity.” H.J. 
Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 237 (1989). 
Here, the District Court denied the post-trial sufficiency 
arguments raised by Fattah, Brand, and Nicholas. It reasoned: 
For a RICO conspiracy to exist, the 
conspirators must agree to participate in an 
enterprise with a unity of purpose as well as 
relationships among those involved. The 
evidence demonstrates that an agreement among 
Fattah, Brand, Nicholas, Lindenfeld, and Naylor 
existed for the overall purpose of maintaining 
and enhancing Fattah as a political figure and of 
preventing his standing from being weakened by 
the failure to be able to pay or write down his 
campaign debts. These five persons agreed to 
work together as a continuing unit, albeit with 
different roles. 
The Government established that Fattah, 
Brand, and Nicholas conspired along with 
Naylor and Lindenfeld to conceal and repay the 
2007 illegal $1,000,000 loan to the Fattah for 
Mayor campaign. 
JA128–29. The District Court further determined that 
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[w]hile each member may not have been 
involved in every aspect of the enterprise, its 
activities were sufficiently structured and 
coordinated to achieve the purpose of 
maintaining and enhancing Fattah’s political 
standing and of preventing him from being 
weakened politically because of his campaign 
debts. 
A RICO conspiracy also requires an 
agreement to participate in an enterprise with 
longevity sufficient to pursue its purpose. This 
was established. In May 2007 the illegal loan 
was obtained and continued through its 
repayment in January 2008 and into at least 2014 
when the last campaign report reducing a fake 
campaign debt to Naylor’s consulting firm was 
filed by Fattah. 
JA131. 
The defendants argue that the evidence is insufficient to 
show either an enterprise for purposes of § 1962(c) or an 
agreement as required for a § 1962(d) conspiracy. We disagree, 
and conclude that the District Court’s analysis is on the mark. 
We begin by considering whether there was an 
agreement. The evidence showed that Fattah knew each 
member involved in the scheme to conceal the unlawful 
campaign loan. When Lindenfeld learned of the $1 million 
loan, he informed Fattah that it exceeded campaign finance 
limits. In short, the transaction was unlawful, and the two knew 
it. The transaction nonetheless went forward, disguised as a 
loan, with Lindenfeld executing the promissory note as 
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Strategies’ officer and obligating Strategies to repay Lord $1 
million. The concealment efforts continued as Lindenfeld 
funneled a substantial portion of the loan proceeds to Naylor 
for get-out-the-vote efforts. After the losing campaign, 
Lindenfeld spoke with Fattah and Naylor about accounting for 
the funds that had been spent. They decided not to include the 
amounts in the FFM campaign reports. Fattah instructed 
Naylor to prepare a fictitious invoice, and Naylor complied. 
The FFM campaign reports filed from 2008 to 2014 disclosed 
nothing about the unlawful $1 million loan. Instead, they 
falsely showed that Naylor’s consulting firm made yearly in-
kind contributions of $20,000 in debt forgiveness, when in 
reality there was no debt to forgive. 
As Lindenfeld fretted over repaying the $600,000 
balance of the Lord loan, Naylor assured him that Fattah had 
promised to take care of the repayment. And the evidence 
supports an inference that Fattah recruited both Nicholas and 
Brand in doing so. As EAA’s director, Nicholas could fund the 
repayment. Brand, through his company, Solutions, acted as 
the middleman: he received the payment from EAA pursuant 
to a fictitious contract, and then forwarded the balance due to 
Strategies pursuant to yet another fictitious contract. Nicholas 
and Brand continued in the spring and summer of 2008 to hide 
the fictitious agreement and the $600,000 payment to 
Lindenfeld to satisfy the Lord loan. 
In short, this evidence shows that Fattah, Lindenfeld, 
Naylor, Brand, and Nicholas all agreed to participate in 
Fattah’s plan to conceal the unlawful campaign loan to 
maintain his political stature. Nicholas and Brand claim that 
they had no knowledge of the false campaign reporting aspect 
of the plan. But as Salinas instructs, conspirators need not 
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“agree to commit or facilitate each and every part of the” 
conspiracy. 522 U.S. at 63. Rather, they “must agree to pursue 
the same criminal objective and may divide up the work, yet 
each [be] responsible for the acts of each other.” Id. at 63–64. 
Thus, a conspirator may agree to “facilitate only some of the 
acts leading to the substantive offense” yet still be criminally 
liable. Id. at 65. 
The evidence showed that a substantial amount of 
money was needed to repay Lord, and that the source of the 
repayment was EAA, a non-profit organization whose funds 
could be spent only for purposes consistent with the terms of 
the grants it received. It also showed that Nicholas was 
presented with a sham contract to legitimize the EAA–
Solutions transaction. We conclude that the evidence is 
sufficient to support an inference that Nicholas knew at the 
start that the plan was unlawful. Yet she still agreed to provide 
the requisite funds and to play a role in concealing the illegal 
campaign loan so that Fattah could maintain his political 
stature. 
As to Brand, even if he did not know that false campaign 
reports were being filed, the evidence is sufficient to show he 
played a key role in the enterprise. From the outset, Brand 
worked to disguise the repayment of the Lord loan as the 
consideration in a sham contract between EAA and Solutions. 
He then arranged for the transfer of funds to Strategies in 
satisfaction of a contractual term in another purported business 
agreement between Solutions and Strategies. The evidence 
reveals that Brand was the point man in the effort to meet the 
January 31, 2008 deadline to repay the Lord loan, and it amply 
shows that Brand also agreed to participate in the plan to hide 
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the illegal campaign loan and its repayment to benefit Fattah 
politically. 
Fattah, Brand, and Nicholas attack their RICO 
conspiracy convictions on another front. They argue that those 
verdicts should be set aside because the evidence fails to show 
that the various schemes alleged in the indictment as part of the 
RICO conspiracy are connected. The RICO count, they assert, 
charges a hub-and-spoke conspiracy that is unconnected by a 
rim. In their view, Fattah is the hub, and the spokes consist of 
a series of independent schemes: the Vederman bribery 
scheme, the payment of the outstanding tuition debt of Fattah’s 
son Chip, the Blue Guardians plan, and the repayment of the 
illegal Lord loan to maintain Fattah’s political stature. They 
argue that, without a unifying rim, their actions cannot 
constitute an enterprise. Again, we disagree. 
In In re Insurance Brokerage Antitrust Litigation, 618 
F.3d 300 (3d Cir. 2010), we concluded, in analyzing one of 
plaintiffs’ RICO claims, that the alleged hub-and-spoke 
enterprise—comprised of broker hubs and insurer spokes—
could not withstand a motion to dismiss because it did not have 
a unifying rim. Id. at 374. We explained that the allegations did 
“not plausibly imply concerted action—as opposed to merely 
parallel conduct—by the insurers, and therefore cannot provide 
a ‘rim’ enclosing the ‘spokes’ of these alleged ‘hub-and-spoke’ 
enterprises.” Id. Thus, the allegations did not “adequately plead 
an association-in-fact enterprise” because the hub-and-spoke 
conspiracy failed to “function as a unit.” Id. 
That is not the case here. The evidence showed that 
Fattah, Brand, and Nicholas agreed to conceal the illegal Lord 
loan. Each acted for the common purpose of furthering Fattah’s 
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political interests. In short, they engaged in concerted activity 
and functioned as a unit. The jury convicted Fattah, Brand, and 
Nicholas of the RICO conspiracy based on the racketeering 
activity of wire fraud and obstruction of justice to conceal the 
unlawful transaction. Because the evidence shows that Fattah, 
Lindenfeld, Naylor, Brand, and Nicholas agreed to protect 
Fattah’s political status by acting to maintain the secrecy of the 
unlawful Lord loan, the alleged lack of a unifying “rim” is not 
fatal to this RICO enterprise. What matters in analyzing the 
structure of this enterprise is that it functioned as a unit. Boyle, 
556 U.S. at 945; In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 
at 374. That “basic requirement” was met. Id. 
We turn next to the contention that the evidence fails to 
establish other components of an enterprise. We conclude that 
much of the evidence supporting the existence of an agreement 
also shows that there was an association-in-fact enterprise. 
Boyle made clear that an association-in-fact enterprise 
must have “a purpose, relationships among those associated 
with the enterprise, and longevity sufficient to permit these 
associates to pursue the enterprise’s purpose.” 556 U.S. at 946. 
The purpose, as we have repeatedly observed, was to maintain 
and preserve Fattah’s political stature by concealing the illegal 
loan and its repayment. Though informal, there were 
relationships among those associated with the enterprise. 
Fattah was at the center of this association and he directed its 
activity. He knew each of the association’s members, and the 
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members knew each other (except, perhaps, for Nicholas, who 
may not have known Lindenfeld).19 
The Government also adduced sufficient proof of the 
longevity component required for an enterprise. The scheme 
began in mid-2007, when Lord made the campaign loan, 
directing the proceeds of the loan to Strategies. From the 
outset, Fattah, Lindenfeld, and Naylor all knew they needed to 
conceal this illegal transaction. They began by fabricating an 
explanation for the source of the funds they spent on election 
day. SLA created a fake invoice for the campaign, showing a 
fictitious debt that Naylor could later forgive by fictitious in-
kind contributions existing only on Fattah’s campaign finance 
reports. 
The effort to disguise the Lord loan was not limited to 
filing false campaign reports. Nicholas and Brand, who joined 
the conspiracy a few months later than the other members, 
understood that they too had to make the fraudulent $600,000 
payment by EAA to Solutions appear legitimate. Nicholas and 
Brand tried to disguise the sham contract as an ordinary 
transaction (even though it called for a six-figure upfront 
payment simply to support Solutions’ various projects), and 
                                              
19 Nicholas’s lack of familiarity with Lindenfeld does not 
undermine her membership in this association-in-fact 
enterprise. We have previously explained that “[i]t is well-
established that one conspirator need not know the identities of 
all his co-conspirators, nor be aware of all the details of the 
conspiracy in order to be found to have agreed to participate in 
it.” United States v. Riccobene, 709 F.2d 214, 225 (3d Cir. 
1983), abrogated on other grounds by Griffin v. United States, 
502 U.S. 46 (1991). 
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they succeeded in keeping it out of the DOJ auditors’ view until 
August 2008. The ruse continued as Solutions funneled the 
$600,000 payment to Strategies under the guise of another 
sham contract (which also required an upfront six-figure 
payment). The scheme then continued as Fattah submitted false 
FFM campaign reports from 2008 through 2014. 
Finally, we consider whether the enterprise conducted 
its affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity, as required 
for a § 1962(c) enterprise. Wire fraud and obstruction of justice 
may constitute “racketeering activity” under § 1961(1). As the 
Supreme Court instructed in H.J. Inc., the “multiple predicates 
within a single scheme” must be related and “amount[] to, or 
threaten[] the likelihood of, continued criminal activity.” 492 
U.S. at 237. Here, the amount of the illegal loan to be concealed 
was substantial. The enterprise needed to write off the fictitious 
debt to Naylor’s consulting firm, and it was urgent that both 
the EAA–Solutions contract and the Solutions–Strategies 
contract be legitimized. We conclude the evidence was 
sufficient to establish that this enterprise conducted its affairs 
through a pattern of racketeering activity and that the predicate 
acts of wire fraud and obstruction of justice were related. The 
racketeering activity furthered the goals of maintaining the 
secrecy of this $1 million illicit campaign loan and of 
preserving Fattah’s political stature. 
Nicholas contends that the evidence fails to establish a 
pattern of racketeering activity because the actions to which 
she agreed did not “extend[] over a substantial period of time” 
as H.J. Inc. requires. 492 U.S. at 242. That case indeed instructs 
that the continuity requirement of a pattern is a “temporal 
concept,” and that “[p]redicate acts extending over a few 
weeks or months” do not satisfy the continuity concept. Id. But 
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the Supreme Court explained that continuity may also be 
established by showing that there is a “threat of continued 
racketeering activity.” Id. Here, the course of fraudulent 
conduct undertaken to secure and to conceal the $1 million 
Lord loan consisted of the creation of sham debts, fictitious 
contracts, and false accounting entries over the course of about 
a year. But because Fattah needed to appear able to retire his 
campaign debt, the enterprise needed to continue filing false 
campaign reports for several years, allowing the annual 
$20,000 in-kind debt forgiveness contributions to appear to 
satisfy Naylor’s fake $193,000 invoice. That evidence was 
sufficient to establish the requisite threat of continued criminal 
activity. See H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 242–43. 
We conclude that the Government met its burden in 
proving that Fattah, Brand, and Nicholas20 engaged in a RICO 
conspiracy in violation of § 1962(d). 
                                              
20 Nicholas also asserts, in passing, that that her conviction 
under § 1962(d) should be set aside because that statutory 
provision is unconstitutionally vague as applied to her. 
According to Nicholas, a person of ordinary intelligence would 
not know that her actions constituted an agreement to 
participate in a RICO enterprise. See United States v. 
Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1104–05 (3d Cir. 1990). To the 
contrary, a person of ordinary intelligence, who had been 
employed by a prominent politician and then became the CEO 
of a nonprofit organization which that politician had founded 
(and, to some extent, continued to direct), would realize that 
agreeing to participate with others in hiding an unlawful 
campaign loan of $1 million could constitute an unlawful 
RICO conspiracy. 
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VI. Variance from the Indictment and Sufficiency of the 
Evidence for Count 2 
Brand and Nicholas challenge their convictions for 
conspiracy to commit wire fraud by arguing that the 
Government’s evidence at trial impermissibly varied from the 
indictment. Nicholas also challenges the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support her conviction for conspiracy to commit 
wire fraud. We address these contentions together.21 
Count 2 of the indictment alleged a single conspiracy. 
JA277–79. Brand and Nicholas assert that the Government’s 
evidence at trial did not support the existence of a single 
conspiracy but instead showed two independent conspiracies, 
only one of which involved the two of them. According to 
Brand and Nicholas, the only conspiracy with which they were 
involved ended more than five years before the Government 
charged them. That would mean that all their conduct falls 
outside the five-year limitations period for wire fraud 
conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 3282. 
“A conviction must be vacated when (1) there is a 
variance between the indictment and the proof presented at trial 
and (2) the variance prejudices a substantial right of the 
defendant.” Kemp, 500 F.3d at 287 (quoting United States v. 
Kelly, 892 F.2d 255, 258 (3d Cir. 1989)). We see no variance, 
and will affirm the District Court. 
                                              
21 In her briefing, Nicholas discusses variance in far less detail 
than Brand, so we refer primarily to Brand’s arguments. See 
Nicholas Br. 54–56. Her variance arguments fail for the same 
reasons that Brand’s fail. 
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A variance exists “if the indictment charges a single 
conspiracy while the evidence presented at trial proves only the 
existence of multiple conspiracies.” Id. “We must determine 
‘whether there was sufficient evidence from which the jury 
could have concluded that the government proved the single 
conspiracy alleged in the indictment.’ ” Id. (quoting Kelly, 892 
F.2d at 258). Viewing the record in the light most favorable to 
the Government, we consider three factors: (1) “whether there 
was a common goal among the conspirators”; (2) “whether the 
agreement contemplated bringing to pass a continuous result 
that will not continue without the continuous cooperation of 
the conspirators”; and (3) “the extent to which the participants 
overlap in the various dealings.” Id. (quoting Kelly, 892 F.2d 
at 259). 
Brand argues that the Government failed to establish a 
common goal among the conspirators. To determine whether 
the conspirators shared a common goal, “we look to the 
underlying purpose of the alleged criminal activity” in a fairly 
broad sense. United States v. Rigas, 605 F.3d 194, 214 (3d Cir. 
2010) (en banc). In Rigas, we described the common goal of 
the defendants as “enriching [themselves] through the plunder 
of [their corporate employer],” id., and we have similarly 
articulated the common goal in fairly general terms elsewhere. 
See United States v. Greenidge, 495 F.3d 85, 93 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(“There was certainly evidence of a common goal among these 
co-conspirators: to make money by depositing stolen and 
altered corporate checks into business accounts.”); Kelly, 892 
F.2d at 259 (“[T]he common goal of all the participants was 
simply to make money selling ‘speed.’ ”). Importantly, a 
common goal may exist even when “conspirators individually 
or in groups perform different tasks in pursuing the common 
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goal,” and a single conspiracy may “attract[] different 
members at different times” or “involve[] different sub-groups 
committing acts in furtherance of the overall plan.” United 
States v. Boyd, 595 F.2d 120, 123 (3d Cir. 1978). 
Here, the indictment described the purpose of the 
unified conspiracy in Count 2 at length: 
It was a purpose of the conspiracy to obtain an 
illegal campaign loan and to fraudulently repay 
that loan with hundreds of thousands of dollars 
of misappropriated charitable funds from Sallie 
Mae and federal grant funds from NASA which 
were intended for educational purposes. 
. . . . It was further a purpose of the 
conspiracy to present FATTAH to the public as 
a perennially viable candidate for public office 
who honored his obligations to his creditors and 
was able to retire his publicly reported campaign 
debts. 
. . . . It was further a purpose of the 
conspiracy to promote FATTAH’s political and 
financial goals through deception by concealing 
and protecting the conspirators’ activities from 
detection and prosecution by law enforcement 
officials and the federal judiciary, as well as from 
exposure by the news media, through means that 
included obstruction of justice and the 
falsification of documents, including Campaign 
Finance Reports, false invoices, contracts, and 
other documents and records. 
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JA277–78, ¶¶ 3–5. 
Brand characterizes the evidence at trial as establishing 
two distinct conspiracies. The first he labels the “diversion of 
funds scheme,” covering the misappropriation of funds by 
Nicholas, Brand, Lindenfeld, and Fattah to repay the Lord loan. 
Brand Br. 34. Brand calls the second conspiracy the “CFR 
scheme,” in which Fattah and Naylor filed the false campaign 
finance reports showing Naylor gradually forgiving a non-
existent debt. Id. 
Brand argues that the only goal of the CFR scheme was 
to cover up how the funds from the illegal campaign loan were 
spent, a goal he distinguishes from that of the diversion of 
funds scheme, which he characterizes as a plan to cover up the 
repayment of the loan with stolen funds. He also argues that 
the evidence does not establish he was involved in, or even 
aware of, the false campaign finance reports filed by Fattah. In 
Brand’s view, that necessarily means the evidence showed two 
separate conspiracies. 
In considering these arguments, we begin by noting that 
one conspiracy can involve multiple subsidiary schemes. 
Rigas, 605 F.3d at 214. It is true that the false campaign finance 
reports, in the narrowest sense, had the specific purpose of 
covering up how the illegal loan funds were used during the 
election. But the false campaign finance reports were also filed 
in furtherance of a broader goal shared by the conspirators 
involved in repayment of the Lord loan. They sought to 
promote Fattah’s political and financial goals by preserving his 
image as a viable candidate and making him appear able to 
repay or otherwise service his campaign debts without 
resorting to illegal means in doing so. The two subsidiary 
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schemes worked in concert in furtherance of this overarching 
goal, and both were directed at covering up how the loan was 
truly repaid. The “diversion of funds scheme” hid the illegal 
(but real) loan repayment through the use of fake contracts; the 
“CFR scheme” showed the seemingly legal (but fake) loan 
forgiveness installments through the creation of fake invoices 
and campaign finance reports. The existence of two 
concealment schemes acting in concert does not undermine the 
unity of the conspiracy of which they were both a part. We 
have no difficulty concluding that the false campaign finance 
reports and the concealed use of stolen funds to repay the Lord 
loan operated together in furtherance of a common goal. 
As for Brand’s argument that he was unaware of the 
false campaign finance reports and therefore could not be a part 
of any conspiracy involving them, it is well-settled that “each 
member of the charged conspiracy is liable for the substantive 
crimes his coconspirators commit in furtherance of the 
conspiracy even if he neither participates in his co-
conspirators’ crimes nor has any knowledge of them.” United 
States v. Bailey, 840 F.3d 99, 112 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing 
Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946)). The 
exceptions to that rule allow a defendant to escape liability for 
a co-conspirator’s crime if: (1) “the substantive offense 
committed by one of the conspirators was not in fact done in 
furtherance of the conspiracy,” (2) “the substantive offense 
committed by one of the conspirators ‘did not fall within the 
scope of the unlawful project,’ ” or (3) “the substantive offense 
committed by one of the conspirators ‘could not be reasonably 
foreseen as a necessary or natural consequence of the unlawful 
agreement.’ ” Id. (quoting Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 647–48). 
There was, as we have concluded, a unity of purpose between 
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the co-conspirators to further Fattah’s political and financial 
goals by secretly obtaining and repaying an illegal campaign 
loan with stolen funds. The filing of false campaign reports 
does not fit within any of the recognized exceptions to co-
conspirator liability, as it was in furtherance of the 
conspiracy’s shared goal, within the scope of the agreement to 
conceal the loan, and foreseeable to Brand and Nicholas. 
Neither Brand nor Nicholas briefed the other two 
factors we consider when determining whether the evidence 
impermissibly varied from the evidence, “whether the 
agreement contemplated bringing to pass a continuous result 
that will not continue without the continuous cooperation of 
the conspirators,” and “the extent to which the participants 
overlap in the various dealings.” Kemp, 500 F.3d at 287 
(quoting Kelly, 892 F.2d at 258). The unified goal of promoting 
Fattah’s political career and maintaining secrecy surrounding 
the illegal loan and the misappropriated funds used to repay it 
required the continuous cooperation of the conspirators. 
Indeed, the efforts of several of them overlapped in every 
aspect of the scheme. And Lindenfeld and Fattah were, at a 
minimum, involved in some way in nearly every aspect of the 
origination of the loan, the false campaign finance reports, and 
the use of misappropriated funds to repay the loan. For his part, 
Naylor was involved in the use of the funds, the false campaign 
finance reports, and to a lesser extent, the repayment of the 
loan. 
Brand (as part of his variance argument) and Nicholas 
(as part of her sufficiency argument) argue that the 
Government did not prove they agreed to conceal their actions, 
and thus the false campaign reports would not be sufficient to 
extend the duration of the conspiracy so that it fell within the 
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statute of limitations. Acts of concealment, such as the false 
campaign reports, are not automatically “in furtherance” of a 
conspiracy. We must determine whether there was “an express 
original agreement among the conspirators to continue to act 
in concert in order to cover up, for their own self-protection, 
traces of the crime after its commission,” as opposed to “a 
conspiracy to conceal . . . being implied from elements which 
will be present in virtually every conspiracy case, that is, 
secrecy plus overt acts of concealment.” Grunewald v. United 
States, 353 U.S. 391, 404 (1957). If the indictment 
“specifically alleges a continuing conspiracy” to conceal the 
crime after the completion of the wire fraud, and such a 
conspiracy can be proven, the statute of limitations does not 
begin to run until the last overt act of concealment. United 
States v. Moses, 148 F.3d 277, 282 (3d Cir. 1998). 
Here, the evidence shows that the conspirators 
expressly agreed to conceal the loan and its repayment. As an 
initial matter, Brand’s only role in the conspiracy was to cover 
up the use of stolen funds by (1) serving as an intermediary 
between Nicholas and Lindenfeld; and (2) agreeing to create 
false documentation (the contracts) with both EAA and 
Strategies for the sole purpose of disguising the payments and 
covering up the wire fraud conspiracy. Nicholas could simply 
have paid Lindenfeld herself (or paid Lord) if she and Brand 
had not agreed to conceal the crime from the start. 
Additionally, and as Brand acknowledges, the false campaign 
finance reports began before the loan was repaid, proving that 
concealment of the crime was contemplated and begun as a 
direct purpose of the conspiracy before Brand and Nicholas 
became involved in the repayment. Nicholas too agreed to 
conceal the repayment, as she implicitly acknowledged in her 
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emails with Brand and Fattah. GSA2. Finally, when Lindenfeld 
briefly strayed from the conspiracy’s commitment to secrecy 
by mentioning the repayment in front of others who did not 
know of the scheme, Brand became “angry,” “took 
[Lindenfeld] out in the hallway,” and chastised him, saying that 
“[Lindenfeld] couldn’t say that sort of []thing” in front of other 
people. JA1670–71. We conclude that the evidence is 
consistent with the allegations in the indictment, which charge 
a single conspiracy consisting of an original agreement to 
conceal the illegal loan and its subsequent illegal repayment to 
further Fattah’s political career. 
Nicholas makes several arguments in passing. She 
suggests that the District Court upheld the conviction after trial 
“on a theory not submitted to the jury.” Nicholas Br. 51. This 
argument is, essentially, that the indictment and the District 
Court’s post-trial ruling described the conspiracy one way, but 
that the jury charge described the conspiracy differently. 
Nicholas argues that the jury was presented with the theory that 
the sole purpose of the false campaign reports under Count 2 
was to “conceal[] the alleged scheme to defraud,” JA5849, 
rather than to support Fattah’s political career, as the District 
Court described the purpose after trial, see JA74. 
Nicholas ignores that part of the jury charge which 
instructed that Count 2 required a finding “[t]hat two or more 
persons agreed to commit wire fraud as charged in the 
indictment.” JA5845 (emphasis added). The jury had access to 
the indictment, and as Nicholas points out, Nicholas Br. 45–
46, the indictment outlines the offense in the same way the 
District Court later described it in its post-trial ruling. The 
District Court consistently described the count, and we see no 
reversible error. 
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Nicholas also argues that the conspiracy charged in 
Count 2 has an objective—“to ‘present Fattah’ as ‘perennially 
viable’ ”—and that such an objective is not illegal. Nicholas Br. 
53. But, of course, the jury was not instructed that it was illegal 
to be a Fattah supporter, or even to work on his campaign. The 
jury was charged specifically on the crime of wire fraud. 
We conclude that there was no impermissible variance 
between the indictment and the Government’s evidence at trial, 
and that there was sufficient evidence to support the 
convictions. We will affirm the convictions of Brand and 
Nicholas for conspiracy to commit wire fraud under Count 2. 
VII. The District Court’s Instruction to the Jury on the 
Meaning of Intent 
Nicholas contends that the District Court improperly 
instructed the jury by using the disjunctive rather than the 
conjunctive at one point in its definition of intent. When 
providing its final charge to the jury, the District Court 
explained: 
Certain of the offenses charged in the 
indictment require that the government prove 
that the charged defendant acted intentionally or 
with intent. This means that the government 
must prove either that (1), it was the defendant’s 
conscious desire or purpose to act in a certain 
way or to cause a certain result; or (2), the 
defendant knew that he or she was acting in that 
way or it would be practically certain to cause 
that result. 
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JA5787 (emphasis added). According to Nicholas, an accurate 
definition of intent required that the final “or” be an “and.” 
Nicholas argues that this was an error so grievous as to 
“effectively eliminate[] the intent element from each offense 
of conviction.”22 Nicholas Br. 26. 
Our review of whether a jury instruction stated the 
proper legal standard is plenary. United States v. Petersen, 622 
F.3d 196, 207 n.7 (3d Cir. 2010). At trial, Nicholas failed to 
object to this portion of the jury charge. Accordingly, our 
review must be for plain error. See United States v. Flores-
Mejia, 759 F.3d 253, 258 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc). 
To prevail on plain error review, Nicholas must 
establish that there was an error, that it was plain (i.e., clear 
                                              
22 The Comment to Third Circuit Model Criminal Jury 
Instruction 5.03 makes clear that the definition of intent 
encapsulates both “specific intent” (acting “purposely” or with 
“conscious object”) and “general intent” (acting “knowingly” 
or “with awareness”). Although Nicholas describes the alleged 
error as “essentially eliminating” the element of intent, we 
think Nicholas’s argument is better understood as a claim that 
the instruction given could have permitted a jury to conclude 
that she acted with only general intent (that she was aware of 
what she was doing), when her crimes require specific intent 
(that she had an illegal purpose). As her brief states, “[p]lainly 
she ‘knowingly’ wrote checks from EAA to [Solutions] and 
made record entries about them; the question was whether she 
intended to defraud EAA and NASA, or to obstruct justice, by 
doing so.” Nicholas Br. 24. We cannot agree with her 
characterization that the instruction resulted in the “effective 
omission” of the intent element from the jury instructions. 
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under current law), and that it affected her substantial rights 
(i.e., whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury 
applied the challenged instruction in an impermissible 
manner). United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733–34 (1993); 
United States v. Dobson, 419 F.3d 231, 239–40 (3d Cir. 2005). 
If these requirements are met, we may then exercise our 
discretion to address the error, but only if we conclude that the 
error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public 
reputation of the judicial proceeding. United States v. Andrews, 
681 F.3d 509, 517 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Johnson v. United 
States, 520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997)). A failure to instruct the jury 
on a necessary element of an offense ordinarily constitutes 
plain error, unless the instructions as a whole otherwise make 
clear to the jury all the necessary elements of the offense. 
United States v. Stimler, 864 F.3d 253, 270 (3d Cir. 2017). 
Nicholas acknowledges, as she must, that the instruction 
given was a verbatim recitation of Instruction 5.03 of the Third 
Circuit’s Model Criminal Jury Instructions. She nonetheless 
contends that our Model Instruction is erroneous. Even if we 
were to accept Nicholas’s contention that the instruction is 
incorrect, a proposition we consider as highly doubtful, see 
Petersen, 622 F.3d at 208 (“We have a hard time concluding 
that the use of our own model jury instruction can constitute 
error . . . .”), we conclude that, considering the instructions as 
a whole, the District Court clearly and specifically instructed 
the jury on the intent element as it applied to each of Nicholas’s 
charged crimes. 
The disputed intent instruction was given at the 
beginning of the final charge, explaining the general meaning 
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of the intent applicable to “[c]ertain of the offenses charged.”23 
JA5787. The District Court went on to instruct the jury in 
specific detail on the elements of each of the crimes of which 
Nicholas was accused, explaining also the intent element of 
each.24 See JA5791 (describing the third element of the RICO 
conspiracy charge as: “the particular defendant and at least one 
                                              
23 The introductory definition did not end with the language 
Nicholas cites. The District Court elaborated that acting in 
good faith is a complete defense to the charges: 
The offenses charged in the indictment 
require proof that the charged defendants acted 
with criminal intent. If you find that a defendant 
acted in good faith that would be a complete 
defense to such a charge, because good faith on 
the part of the defendant would be inconsistent 
with his or her acting knowingly, willfully, 
corruptly, or with intent to defraud or intent to 
impede, obstruct, or wrongfully influence. 
JA5788–89 (emphasis added). This instruction undermines 
Nicholas’s claim that the jury could have reasonably concluded 
that she “ ‘knowingly’ wrote checks” but did not “intend[] to 
defraud . . . or to obstruct justice[] by doing so,” Nicholas Br. 
24, as this instruction leaves little room for doubt that good 
faith is at odds with “criminal intent.” 
 
24 Nicholas did not object to the knowledge and intent 
instructions when the District Court discussed each of the 
individual charges, and does not identify a disagreement with 
any specific instruction on any particular charge. 
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other alleged conspirator shared a unity of purpose and the 
intent to achieve the objective of conducting or participating in 
the conduct of an enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of 
racketeering activity”); JA5823 (regarding wire fraud, 
instructing that the government must prove “[t]hat the 
defendant under consideration acted with the intent to 
defraud”); JA5838–39 (regarding obstruction of justice, 
instructing that the defendant must have acted “with the intent 
to impair the record, document, or object’s integrity or 
availability for use in an official proceeding,” and must have 
acted corruptly “with the purpose of wrongfully impeding the 
due administration of justice”); JA5860 (explaining that 
falsification of records requires that “the defendant under 
consideration acted with the intent to impede, obstruct or 
influence the investigation or proper administration of a 
matter”). These instructions are consistent with both our Model 
Jury Instructions and our case law concerning the elements of 
these crimes. See Third Circuit Model Criminal Jury 
Instruction 6.18.1962D (RICO), 6.18.1343 (wire fraud), 
6.18.1512A2 (obstruction of justice); United States v. 
Sussman, 709 F.3d 155, 168 (3d Cir. 2013) (obstruction of 
justice); United States v. Moyer, 674 F.3d 192, 208–09 (3d Cir. 
2012) (falsification of records); United States v. Pelullo 
(Pelullo I), 964 F.2d 193, 216 (3d Cir. 1992) (wire fraud). 
The District Court also provided a separate definition of 
the knowledge element of each charge, illustrating the 
difference between knowledge and intent. See JA5793 
(explaining that the evidence must show that a RICO defendant 
“knowingly agreed to facilitate or further a course of conduct, 
which if completed would include a pattern of racketeering 
activity”); JA5823 (wire fraud means that the defendant 
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“knowingly devised a scheme to defraud a victim . . . by 
materially false or fraudulent pretenses”); JA5860 
(falsification of records has as an element “[t]hat the defendant 
under consideration knowingly concealed, covered up, 
falsified or made false entries in a document or record”). These 
instructions made clear that knowledge and intent are separate 
considerations, undermining Nicholas’s contention that the 
jury was led to believe that “knowledge is sufficient to prove 
intent.” Nicholas Br. 24. 
The District Court provided each member of the jury 
with more than 100 pages of instructions before deliberations 
began. Viewing those instructions as a whole, we are satisfied 
that the jury was apprised of the correct meaning of intent as 
an element of the crimes with which Nicholas was charged, as 
well as the distinction between knowledge and intent. We 
perceive no error, much less error that is plain, in the District 
Court’s instructions to the jury.25 
VIII. Sending the Indictment to the Jury 
At trial, Vederman, Nicholas, and Brand objected to the 
District Court’s decision to give the jury a redacted copy of the 
indictment to use during its deliberations. Only Nicholas and 
Brand raise this issue on appeal. In Nicholas’s view, sending 
the indictment to the jury unfairly prejudiced her because it 
contained unsupported allegations that she had obstructed 
federal agencies and referred to a nonexistent certification 
requirement for Sallie Mae funds. Brand argues that he was 
                                              
25 Accordingly, we need not consider the merits of Nicholas’s 
argument that Model Criminal Jury Instruction 5.03 is 
erroneous. 
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prejudiced by the indictment’s references to “schemes” and 
“fake” contracts, and because it mentioned Brand’s spouse and 
that she was a former member of Fattah’s congressional staff. 
Nicholas and Brand together assert that the indictment 
included legal theories on which the jury was not instructed. 
They contend that the indictment’s narrative of the 
Government’s case set out a roadmap that omitted any 
averments relating to the defense theory and allowed the 
Government to yet again present its case. To buttress that 
argument, Nicholas and Brand cite the testimony of Juror 12, 
who described the jury’s initial deliberations and alleged that 
the jurors viewed the indictment as evidence. 
In United States v. Todaro, 448 F.2d 64, 66 (3d Cir. 
1971), we held that the decision to allow “jurors to have a copy 
of the indictment with them during their deliberations . . . is a 
matter within the discretion of the District Judge, subject to a 
limiting instruction that the indictment does not constitute 
evidence, but is an accusation only.” Subsequently, in United 
States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1142 n.83 (3d Cir. 1990), 
we acknowledged that the District Court has the power to 
redact the indictment if doing so would be appropriate to avoid 
prejudice to the defendant. See also United States v. Roy, 473 
F.3d 1232, 1237 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (noting that court may 
redact an indictment before submitting it to the jury). 
While both Nicholas and Brand objected in general 
terms to the District Court’s decision to provide the indictment 
to the jury, they have not directed us to any specific request to 
redact the information they now claim is prejudicial. And the 
District Court provided a limiting instruction on four occasions 
during its charge, repeatedly emphasizing that the indictment 
was not evidence. JA5765, 5767, 5782, 5880. The Court 
110 
instructed the jury on its duty to base its verdict “solely upon 
the evidence in the case.” JA5764. Just before the jury retired 
to deliberate, the Court reiterated that the purpose of the 
indictment is to set forth the charges, and that it is “merely an 
accusation.” JA5909. 
“[J]uries are presumed to follow their instructions . . . .” 
Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987). In our view, 
Juror 12’s assertion that the indictment was being considered 
evidence does not, standing alone, establish that his fellow 
jurors actually did so. We reject the notion that the jury, after 
hearing weeks of testimony and having viewed substantial 
documentary evidence, went on to ignore the Court’s limiting 
instruction concerning the indictment.26 Accordingly, we 
                                              
26 We acknowledge that our case law provides minimal 
guidance to district courts concerning the practice of sending 
an indictment to the jury for their use during deliberations. We 
are also aware that some courts have disapproved the practice 
of sending the indictment out with the jury. See United States 
v. Esso, 684 F.3d 347, 352 n.5 (2d Cir. 2012); Roy, 473 F.3d at 
1237 n.2. We emphasize that this practice is committed to the 
sound discretion of the district judge. Todaro, 448 F.2d at 66. 
In our view, such an exercise of a judge’s discretion should be 
informed by considering the nature of the case, the number of 
defendants, the length of the indictment, the extent of the 
factual recitation supporting the criminal charges, and most 
importantly, whether the indictment (especially if lengthy and 
fact-laden) will be useful to the jury, in light of the judge’s own 
carefully tailored jury instruction, as supplemented by a verdict 
slip. See Esso, 684 F.3d at 352 n.5. 
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conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
sending the indictment out to the jury. 
IX. The District Court’s Evidentiary Rulings 
Vederman, Nicholas, and Brand each challenge 
evidentiary rulings by the District Court. We conclude that 
none of these contentions warrants setting aside their 
convictions. 
A. The District Court’s Application of Rule 404(b) 
Vederman argues that the District Court misapplied 
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) when it excluded evidence of 
Vederman’s prior gift-giving.27 This Court reviews a district 
court’s application of Rule 404(b) for abuse of discretion. 
United States v. Daraio, 445 F.3d 253, 259 (3d Cir. 2006); 
Ansell v. Green Acres Contracting Co., 347 F.3d 515, 519 (3d 
Cir. 2003). A trial court commits “[a]n abuse of discretion . . . 
when [the] district court’s decision rests upon a clearly 
erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an 
                                              
27 Although Rule 404(b) determinations are usually in response 
to attempts to introduce “bad” acts evidence, Vederman’s 
attempt to introduce “good” acts of gift-giving is properly 
analyzed under the same rule. Ansell v. Green Acres 
Contracting Co., 347 F.3d 515, 520 (3d Cir. 2003) (“The 
evidence admitted in this case differs from garden variety Rule 
404(b) matter because it is evidence, not of a prior bad act in a 
criminal case, but of a subsequent good act in a civil case. 
Nonetheless, this evidence is encompassed by the plain text of 
Rule 404(b) which addresses ‘other . . . acts,’ not just prior bad 
acts.”). 
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improper application of law to fact.” Pardini v. Allegheny 
Intermediate Unit, 524 F.3d 419, 422 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting 
P.N. v. Clementon Bd. of Educ., 442 F.3d 848, 852 (3d Cir. 
2006)). 
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides in part: 
(b) Crimes, Wrongs, or Other Acts. 
(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime, 
wrong, or other act is not admissible 
to prove a person’s character in order 
to show that on a particular occasion 
the person acted in accordance with 
the character. 
(2) Permitted Uses; Notice in a Criminal 
Case. This evidence may be 
admissible for another purpose, such 
as proving motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, absence of mistake, or lack 
of accident. 
Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1)–(2). 
At trial, Vederman sought to present a witness from 
American University who would have testified that “Vederman 
agreed, on more than fifty instances, to financially assist 
students [at American] who needed help with tuition, book 
money, or travel funds to visit their families.” Vederman Br. 
42 (emphasis omitted). According to Vederman, the testimony 
was relevant to refuting the Government’s argument that he 
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agreed to guarantee the tuition expenses of Fattah’s au pair as 
a way of bribing the congressman. In excluding this evidence 
under Rule 404(b), the District Court stated at sidebar: 
I sustain the government’s objection to calling a 
representative of American University to testify 
on behalf of Herbert Vederman. 
In my view the testimony runs afoul of 
Rule 404(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 
I find it to be propensity evidence. He or she 
would be testifying about Mr. Vederman’s 
financial generosity with respect to students of 
American University. 
The issue here is payment of partial 
tuition of a student at the Philadelphia 
University. I see no connection between the 
generosity at American University and the 
situation with Philadelphia University. 
JA4459–60. Vederman argues that because the proposed 
evidence related to Vederman’s intent, and not solely his 
propensity to perform good acts, we should conclude that the 
District Court abused its discretion. We see no error in the 
District Court’s ruling. 
Vederman challenges as arbitrary the District Court’s 
“assertion that support for American University students is too 
remote from support for Philadelphia University students” 
such that it constitutes inadmissible evidence. Vederman Reply 
Br. 23. This distinction was far from arbitrary. Vederman may 
well have financially supported American University students 
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because of connections he had to that school or to the D.C. 
community at large—connections Vederman did not have to 
Philadelphia University. And the excluded testimony appears 
to have described support for students Vederman did not 
previously know. By supporting Fattah’s au pair, Vederman 
was helping an employee of a man whom he knew quite well. 
JA889 (“[Fattah and Vederman] spent a lot of time together 
traveling back and forth to Washington, in the case of a death 
in the family attending certain ceremonies that were important, 
and above all spending time with each other and their families 
together.”). Vederman’s decision to help Fattah’s au pair, who 
wished to attend Philadelphia University, seems more like a 
departure from, rather than a continuation of, his pattern of 
support for American University students. 
As the party seeking admission of evidence under Rule 
404(b), Vederman bore “the burden of demonstrating its 
applicability” and “identifying a proper purpose.” United 
States v. Caldwell, 760 F.3d 267, 276 (3d Cir. 2014). By failing 
to explain sufficiently why the factual distinctions discussed 
above were not material, Vederman failed to meet his burden. 
In particular, although Vederman argues that he offered 
evidence of his prior gift-giving to prove intent—“a proper 
non-propensity purpose”—he failed to show why the proposed 
testimony was “relevant to that identified purpose.” Id. at 
277.28 As we noted in Ansell v. Green Acres Contracting, an 
                                              
28 Under Rule 404(b), “prior act evidence is inadmissible 
unless the evidence is (1) offered for a proper non-propensity 
purpose that is at issue in the case; (2) relevant to that identified 
purpose; (3) sufficiently probative under Rule 403 such that its 
probative value is not outweighed by any inherent danger of 
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employment discrimination case on which Vederman heavily 
relies, “[t]here is. . . no bright line rule for determining when 
evidence is too remote to be relevant.” 347 F.3d at 525. As 
such, a district court’s determination under Rule 404(b) “will 
not be disturbed on appeal unless it amounts to an abuse of 
discretion.” Id. The District Court did not abuse its discretion 
in excluding evidence of Vederman’s support for students at 
American University. 
B. Evidentiary Rulings Regarding Nicholas’s Defense 
Nicholas argues that the District Court rendered three 
erroneous evidentiary rulings that prejudiced her defense. We 
do not find any of her arguments convincing. 
1. The EAA Board Minutes 
In support of its theory that Nicholas defrauded EAA, 
the Government introduced minutes from EAA’s Board. 
Minutes from 2005 revealed that the Board limited Nicholas’s 
signing authority to $100,000. Minutes from December 2007, 
February 2008, and May 2008 failed to reference either the 
EAA–Solutions contract or the checks, drawn from EAA’s 
account for $500,000 and $100,000, that were purportedly paid 
pursuant to the contract. Nicholas contends that the Board 
minutes were erroneously admitted because they constituted 
improper hearsay which failed to satisfy either the exception 
for business records under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) or 
the absence of records exception under Federal Rule of 
                                              
unfair prejudice; and (4) accompanied by a limiting 
instruction, if requested.” United States v. Caldwell, 760 F.3d 
267, 277–78 (3d Cir. 2014). 
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Evidence 803(7). “We review the District Court’s evidentiary 
ruling[s] for abuse of discretion, but also ‘exercise plenary 
review . . . to the extent [the rulings] are based on a legal 
interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence.’ ” Repak, 852 
F.3d at 240 (citations omitted) (second alteration in original). 
At trial, no defendant objected to the testimony of 
EAA’s Board Chairman Raymond Jones about the 2005 EAA 
Board minutes, which indicated that the Board limited 
Nicholas’s authority to spend funds without Board approval to 
$100,000. Nor was there objection to the admission of EAA’s 
Board minutes from December 2007, February 2008, and May 
2008 during Special Agent Rene Michael’s testimony. Because 
Nicholas failed to preserve these evidentiary issues, we review 
for plain error. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). 
As to the 2005 minutes, the prosecution’s direct 
examination of Jones failed to expressly track each of the 
prerequisites for admission of a business record under Rule 
803(6). Still, Jones’ testimony was sufficient for purposes of 
Rule 803(6) because he stated that he was Board Chairman at 
the relevant time, the Board’s practice was to keep accurate 
minutes of its meetings, the Board passed the motion to limit 
Nicholas’s signing authority, and Jones recognized the 
document as the minutes of a Board meeting. We conclude that 
the District Court did not commit plain error by permitting this 
unobjected-to testimony to remain in the record. 
Jones, who chaired the Board from 2004 to 2007, 
testified that Nicholas’s authority to bind EAA to contracts was 
limited to $100,000, and that any contracts in excess of that 
amount were to be brought to the Board’s attention. EAA’s 
accountant, Janice Salter, testified that EAA maintained a 
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procedure for disbursements which required the completion of 
a check request form to document the purpose of the check for 
approval of the payment by Nicholas. Yet Jones testified that 
he never saw a request form for either the $500,000 check or 
the $100,000 check to Solutions. We conclude that the 
Government laid an adequate foundation under Rule 803(7) for 
admitting the Board minutes from 2005, December 2007, 
February 2008, and May 2008, and for highlighting that none 
of them mentioned the EAA–Solutions contract requiring an 
upfront payment of well over $100,000. 
Nicholas correctly points out that the minutes of some 
monthly meetings were not among the documents that were 
admitted. But this point simply makes plain that she could have 
objected on that basis and did not. Given the lack of an 
objection and the existence of a proper foundation, admission 
of EAA’s Board minutes was not an abuse of discretion. 
Nicholas also asserts that, even if Rules 803(6) and (7) 
permitted admission of the Board minutes, they were of 
minimal relevance and unfairly prejudicial. We disagree. Not 
only is the evidence relevant, any possible prejudice was 
minimized by the fact that the Board minutes make no 
reference to either the EAA–Solutions contract or to any 
financial matters whatsoever. Indeed, given these lacunae in 
the Government’s proof, a reasonable factfinder might well 
have concluded that the Board’s intention to limit Nicholas’s 
signing authority had not been implemented and that Nicholas 
had not concealed the contract from the Board. 
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2. Jones’ Memory Regarding Other Contracts 
Nicholas next asserts that the District Court erred during 
her cross-examination of Board Chairman Jones by sustaining 
the prosecution’s objection to her inquiry into whether he 
remembered other contracts in excess of $100,000 being 
brought to the Board. See JA1386–87. The basis of the 
prosecution’s objection seemed to be that Nicholas’s line of 
inquiry was beyond the scope of the direct testimony. JA1387 
(“I showed checks concerning what’s going on, not other 
programs.”); see Fed. R. Evid. 611(b). The District Court 
sustained the objection, declaring that “it has absolutely 
nothing to do with this case.” JA1387. Nicholas contends that 
if Jones did not recall whether other large contracts had been 
presented to the Board, his inability to recall the EAA–
Solutions contract would have been “unremarkable rather than 
evidence of fraud or concealment.” Nicholas Br. 61. 
We acknowledge that whether Jones remembered other 
large contracts requiring Board approval had some relevance 
under Rule 401. Yet any error by the District Court in 
prohibiting Nicholas’s counsel from pursuing this line of 
inquiry is harmless. Jones admitted that he did not know if the 
Board ever implemented the policy requiring its approval of 
contracts exceeding $100,000. He also conceded that the EAA 
Board focused less on the financial side of EAA than on its 
programs. JA1383–85. Nicholas could not have been 
prejudiced by the District Court’s ruling. 
3. Exclusion of NOAA Evidence 
Nicholas defended against the criminal charges arising 
out of the non-existent October 2012 conference by asserting 
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that she acted in “good faith in spending the NOAA funds on 
EAA expenses,” Nicholas Br. 64, that the difference in the 
dates in the paperwork was not material, and that NOAA had 
received the benefits of the sponsorship because its logo was 
displayed on the signage used at the February conference. 
Nicholas succeeded in presenting testimony and introducing 
photographs that showed NOAA’s logo on the February 2012 
annual conference bags, padfolios, and name tags. The Court 
excluded a photograph of a NOAA intern at the February 2012 
conference, other photographs of the February conference 
signage, and some checks that pertained to the February 
conference. Nicholas claims that her inability to introduce 
those exhibits frustrated her ability to present her good faith 
defense. We are not persuaded. 
The photographs were excluded as cumulative, the sort 
of ruling to which we afford trial judges very broad discretion. 
See Fed. R. Evid. 403; United States v. Dalfonso, 707 F.2d 757, 
762 (3d Cir. 1983). It was not error to exclude the student 
intern’s photograph. The conference brochure included 
photographs from previous conferences, and the witness from 
NOAA was unable to testify to the year the student served as 
an intern. Finally, the checks tendered for the travel expenses 
incurred for the February conference were excluded as 
irrelevant to whether Nicholas had a good faith belief that 
NOAA sponsored the October conference. 
C. The Cooperating Witness’s Mental Health Records 
During discovery, Brand learned that a cooperating 
witness was diagnosed with bipolar II disorder and was taking 
medication to treat that condition. Brand subpoenaed mental 
health records kept by the witness’s current and former 
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psychiatrists in hopes of using those records to attack the 
witness’s memory, truthfulness, and credibility. The witness 
and the Government both filed motions to quash the subpoena, 
arguing that the witness’s mental health records were protected 
by the psychotherapist–patient privilege recognized by the 
Supreme Court in Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996). The 
Government also filed a motion in limine seeking to restrict the 
scope of cross-examination to prevent Brand from questioning 
the witness about his mental health. 
Alongside his motion to quash, the witness voluntarily 
produced for the Court his mental health records. The Court 
concluded that the psychotherapist–patient privilege would 
ordinarily apply to the mental health records, but that the 
privilege was not absolute, especially when invoked in 
response to a criminal defendant’s efforts to obtain through 
discovery evidence that is favorable to his case. Following the 
procedure set forth in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 
(1987), the District Court conducted an in camera review of the 
mental health records to determine if they contained material 
evidence—that is, evidence that would “give[] rise to a 
reasonable probability that it [would] affect the outcome of the 
case.” JA149. The District Court found “nothing in the mental 
health records of the [witness] . . . material for this criminal 
action,” noting that “[t]he records reveal nothing that calls into 
question [the witness’s] memory, perception, competence, or 
veracity.” JA150. Accordingly, the Court entered an order 
granting the motions to quash the subpoena. 
The District Court also granted the Government’s 
motion in limine and restricted the scope of cross-examination, 
ruling that “no reference may be made to [the witness’s] 
bipolar disorder or the medications he takes to manage it.” 
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JA142, 156. The Court reasoned that bipolar disorder varied in 
its effects from person to person, and concluded that Brand had 
not shown that the effects of the disorder had any bearing on 
the witness’s credibility. The District Court ruled that cross-
examination would not serve any valid impeachment purpose. 
Brand claims that the District Court’s order ran afoul of 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the 
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. We review a 
district court’s rulings to quash a subpoena and to limit the 
scope of cross-examination for abuse of discretion. United 
States v. Tykarsky, 446 F.3d 458, 475 (3d Cir. 2006); NLRB v. 
Frazier, 966 F.2d 812, 815 (3d Cir. 1992). Here, the District 
Court did not abuse that discretion. 
1. The District Court’s Denial of Access to the Mental 
Health Records 
In claiming that the District Court’s decision to review 
the mental health records in camera before ruling on their 
admissibility violated his rights under both the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments, Brand specifically argues that his right to 
confront the witness was impeded because he was denied 
access to records he could have used to impeach the witness. 
This very argument was considered and rejected by a plurality 
of the Supreme Court in Ritchie, which noted that “the effect 
[of the argument] would be to transform the Confrontation 
Clause into a constitutionally compelled rule of pretrial 
discovery. . . . [T]he right to confrontation is a trial right, 
designed to prevent improper restrictions on the types of 
questions that defense counsel may ask during cross-
examination.” 480 U.S. at 52. We follow the Ritchie plurality, 
and conclude that the Confrontation Clause did not require the 
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District Court to grant Brand access to the witness’s mental 
health records. 
Brand next challenges the District Court’s decision to 
quash the subpoena as a violation of the Fifth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause. He concedes that Ritchie’s Due Process 
holding allowed the District Court to review the mental health 
records in camera without disclosing them to him. See id. at 
59–60 (“A defendant’s right to discover exculpatory evidence 
does not include the unsupervised authority to search through 
[the Government’s] files. . . . We find that [the defendant’s] 
interest . . . in ensuring a fair trial can be protected fully by 
requiring that the [privileged] files be submitted only to the 
trial court for in camera review.”). Brand instead argues that 
the District Court abused its discretion by focusing on 
“irrelevant facts and spurious symptoms. . . . such as 
‘hallucinations,’ ” and by “refus[ing] to consider evidence of 
cognitive impairment and memory issues.” Brand Br. 30. The 
record reveals, however, that the District Court reviewed the 
mental health records and determined that they “reveal[ed] 
nothing that calls into question [the witness’s] memory, 
perception, competence, or veracity.” JA150. This hardly 
amounts to a refusal to consider evidence of cognitive 
impairment or memory issues. 
Brand also challenges the legal standard applied by the 
District Court, arguing that the court “focused solely on 
whether disclosure would ‘change the outcome’ of Brand’s 
trial,” Brand Br. 29 (quoting JA148), rather than considering 
“whether the ultimate verdict is one ‘worthy of confidence.’ ” 
Id. (quoting United States v. Robinson, 583 F.3d 1265, 1270 
(10th Cir. 2009)). Brand misleadingly quotes from the District 
Court’s opinion. The District Court considered, in accordance 
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with Ritchie, “whether there is a reasonable probability that 
disclosure would change the outcome” of Brand’s trial, JA148 
(emphasis added), not whether disclosure would necessarily 
change the outcome. As articulated in Ritchie, a “ ‘reasonable 
probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence 
in the outcome.” 480 U.S. at 57 (quoting United States v. 
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (Blackmun, J.)). The District 
Court applied the correct standard. 
2. The District Court’s Grant of the Motion in Limine 
In granting the Government’s motion in limine, the 
District Court ruled that Brand could not “reference . . . [the 
witness’s] bipolar disorder or the medications he takes to 
manage it.” JA156. Yet that ruling placed no restriction on 
Brand’s ability to cross-examine the witness with respect to 
“his memory, competence, or truthfulness.” Id. Brand argues, 
nevertheless, that his Sixth Amendment right “to be confronted 
with the witnesses against him” was violated. U.S. Const. 
amend. VI. 
The Confrontation Clause protects a defendant’s right 
to cross-examine a witness with respect to any testimonial 
statements made by that witness. United States v. Berrios, 676 
F.3d 118, 125–26 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004), and Davis v. Washington, 
547 U.S. 813, 823–24 (2006)). But the scope of cross-
examination is not unlimited, and “[a] district court retains 
‘wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned 
to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based 
on concerns about . . . harassment, prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or 
only marginally relevant.’ ” John-Baptiste, 747 F.3d at 211 
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(quoting United States v. Mussare, 405 F.3d 161, 169 (3d Cir. 
2005)). We review limitations on cross-examination for abuse 
of discretion, and reverse “only when the restriction ‘is so 
severe as to constitute a denial of the defendant’s right to 
confront witnesses against him and . . . is prejudicial to [his] 
substantial rights.’ ” Id. (alternation in original) (quoting 
United States v. Conley, 92 F.3d 157, 169 (3d Cir. 1996)). 
In United States v. Chandler, 326 F.3d 210, 219 (3d Cir. 
2003), we analyzed whether a district court’s decision to limit 
cross-examination with respect to a witness’s motivation for 
testifying violated the Confrontation Clause. See also Mussare, 
405 F.3d at 169; John-Baptiste, 747 F.3d at 211–12. Consistent 
with Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986), we first 
concluded that “the exposure of a witness’ motivation in 
testifying is a proper and important function of the 
constitutionally protected right of cross-examination.” 
Chandler, 326 F.3d at 219–20 (quoting Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 
at 678–79). We also noted that the Confrontation Clause does 
not prevent a trial judge from imposing reasonable limits on 
cross-examination. Id. In reviewing a district judge’s 
imposition of such limitations, we apply a two-part analysis. 
As we have since described, “we inquire into: ‘(1) whether the 
limitation significantly limited the defendant’s right to inquire 
into a witness’s motivation for testifying; and (2) whether the 
constraints imposed fell within the reasonable limits that a 
district court has the authority to impose.’ ” John-Baptiste, 747 
F.3d at 211–12 (quoting Mussare, 405 F.3d at 169). 
The same analytical framework is appropriate when 
determining whether a restriction on the cross-examination of 
a witness with respect to his memory and perception violates 
the Confrontation Clause. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 
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316 (1974); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959); 
United States v. Segal, 534 F.2d 578, 582 (3d Cir. 1976). 
Memory and perception, like motivation for testifying, are 
central issues affecting the credibility of any witness, and 
unreasonable limitations on the right to cross-examine on those 
subjects cannot be countenanced. We therefore ask, 
paraphrasing Chandler: (1) whether the District Court’s 
decision to put the witness’s diagnosis and medications off 
limits significantly impaired Brand’s right to inquire into the 
witness’s memory and perception; and (2) whether the ruling 
fell within the reasonable limits that the District Court has the 
authority to impose. 
We conclude that the District Court did not err. As an 
initial matter, the District Court permitted Brand to cross-
examine the witness about his memory and perception, and 
limited cross-examination only with respect to the witness’s 
bipolar disorder and the medications he was taking to treat that 
condition. Brand was free to question the witness about his 
memory and perception, and indeed did so. The restriction on 
asking the witness about his bipolar disorder was not a 
significant limitation of Brand’s right to inquire into the 
witness’s memory or perception. Moreover, as the District 
Court pointed out, Brand failed to show how inquiry into the 
witness’s bipolar disorder would be useful for impeachment 
purposes. See JA154. 
Given that failure, the District Court’s limits on cross-
examination were reasonable. The Court concluded, after 
reviewing the evidence submitted by Brand and the witness’s 
mental health records, that any mention of the witness’s bipolar 
disorder would “only be designed to confuse the jury or to 
stigmatize him unfairly because of a ‘mental problem’ without 
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any countervailing probative value.” JA155. The District Court 
did not abuse its discretion in limiting Brand’s cross-
examination on a topic that would be far more prejudicial than 
probative. See Tykarsky, 446 F.3d at 476–77 (“[T]he District 
Court acted well within its discretion to restrict irrelevant and 
confusing testimony.”). 
All of this is not to suggest that a witness’s mental 
health is always off limits. The appropriate course in any given 
case must be determined from the facts and circumstances 
surrounding that case and the witness’s particular condition. 
See United States v. George, 532 F.3d 933, 937 (D.C. Cir. 
2008) (“The days are long past when any mental illness was 
presumed to undermine a witness’s competence to testify. . . . 
[M]ental illness [is] potentially relevant in a broad[] range of 
circumstances . . . . [But] some indication is needed that a 
particular witness’s medical history throws some doubt on the 
witness’s competence or credibility.”). Here, Brand failed to 
show, through mental health records or otherwise, any 
particularized reason to doubt the credibility of the witness for 
medical reasons. 
Brand states that the witness provided “the only 
evidence offered” on the intent element of his conspiracy 
conviction and that he should therefore be entitled to 
unrestricted cross-examination. Yet no matter the importance 
of a witness to any party, a district court may always place 
reasonable limits on cross-examination to avoid “harassment, 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or 
interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.” 
John-Baptiste, 747 F.3d at 211 (citation omitted). 
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We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in restricting the scope of Brand’s cross-examination 
of the cooperating witness. 
X. The Government’s Cross-Appeal 
The jury convicted Fattah, Vederman, and Bowser of 
bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 134429 (Count 19) and making false 
statements to a financial institution, 18 U.S.C. § 101430 (Count 
20). In response to post-trial motions, the District Court 
granted a judgment of acquittal on both counts under Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 29, concluding that the evidence was insufficient to 
establish that the Credit Union Mortgage Association 
(CUMA), the entity to whom Fattah, Vederman, and Bowser 
made the false statements, is a “financial institution,” or, more 
                                              
29 “Whoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a 
scheme or artifice . . . to defraud a financial institution . . . shall 
be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 
30 years, or both.” The definition of “financial institution” for 
purposes of § 1344 is set forth at 18 U.S.C. § 20, and includes 
“a credit union with accounts insured by the National Credit 
Union Share Insurance Fund” and “a mortgage lending 
business (as defined in section 27 of this Title).” 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 20(2), (10). 
30 “Whoever knowingly makes any false statement or report, or 
willfully overvalues any land, property or security, for the 
purpose of influencing in any way the action of . . . a Federal 
credit union . . . any institution the accounts of which are 
insured by . . . the National Credit Union Administration Board 
. . . or a mortgage lending business . . . shall be fined not more 
than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or 
both.” 
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specifically, a “mortgage lending business” as defined in 18 
U.S.C. § 27. The Government claims that, viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to it, the District Court 
erred and that CUMA is, indeed, a “mortgage lending 
business.” We agree. Because the evidence is sufficient to 
support the jury’s verdict, we will remand so Fattah and 
Vederman may be resentenced on these charges.31 
A. CUMA is a Mortgage Lending Business 
In reviewing the District Court’s post-verdict judgment 
of acquittal under Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, we consider whether the evidence, when viewed in 
a light most favorable to the government, supports the jury’s 
verdict. United States v. Dixon, 658 F.2d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 
1981). Our standard of review is the same as that applied by 
the District Court, and we must uphold the jury’s verdict unless 
no reasonable juror could accept the evidence as sufficient to 
support the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
United States v. Coleman, 811 F.2d 804, 807 (3d Cir. 1987). 
Initially, the grand jury’s indictment alleged that 
CUMA is a financial institution because it is federally insured. 
JA302–03. At trial, however, the jury was instructed that 
CUMA could qualify as a financial institution either because it 
is federally insured or because it is a “mortgage lending 
business.” See JA111, 401–02. A “mortgage lending business” 
is “an organization which finances or refinances any debt 
                                              
31 Because the Government did not file an appeal as to Bowser, 
the cross-appeal is limited to Fattah and Vederman. The 
judgment of acquittal as to Bowser is therefore unaffected by 
our ruling today. 
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secured by an interest in real estate, including private mortgage 
companies and any subsidiaries of such organizations, and 
whose activities affect interstate or foreign commerce.” 18 
U.S.C. § 27. 
At trial, CUMA’s president and CEO, Eddie Scott 
Toler, testified that CUMA is not federally insured. JA4235. 
The Government therefore attempted to prove that CUMA is a 
“mortgage lending business” by presenting evidence that 
CUMA funds mortgages and then sells them in a secondary 
market. 
Toler also testified that CUMA is a “credit union service 
organization”—a for-profit company owned by 48 credit 
unions, which serves small credit unions that do not have the 
infrastructure or in-house expertise to handle mortgage loans 
themselves. JA4235. According to Toler, “[CUMA] 
exclusively provide[s] First Trust Residential Mortgage 
loaning [sic] services, all the way from the origination of the 
mortgage loan through processing, underwriting, closing and 
access to the secondary market where—and we’re selling the 
mortgage loan on the secondary market.” JA4236–37. In 
jurisdictions in which CUMA is licensed,32 CUMA holds the 
mortgage for a limited period, generally from two to thirty 
days, and then sells the mortgage either to a partner credit 
union or on the secondary market. JA4240. 
The District Court concluded that CUMA is not a 
“mortgage lending business” because “[t]he record is devoid 
of any evidence that CUMA finances or refinances any debt.” 
                                              
32 CUMA is licensed in Maryland, Washington, D.C., and 
Virginia. JA4238. 
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JA113. Concluding that CUMA “simply is a loan processor for 
various credit unions which do the financing or refinancing,” 
id., the District Court ruled that CUMA’s “activity does not 
constitute the financing or refinancing of any debt. CUMA is 
not the mortgagee. It is merely selling the debt instrument to a 
third party.” JA114. 
We cannot agree with the District Court’s view of the 
evidence. Toler testified that in “Maryland, D.C., and Virginia 
. . . all of the loans are closed in the name of CUMA.” JA4238–
39. As Toler described it, CUMA borrows on a line of credit to 
fund the loan, and when the loan is sold, CUMA pays off its 
line of credit. JA4239–40. So contrary to the District Court’s 
assessment, the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to 
the Government, shows that CUMA is indeed the mortgagee—
at least during the time from closing until the loan is sold to a 
partner credit union or on the secondary market. The fact that 
CUMA funds the closing and then holds the mortgage, even 
for a brief time, is sufficient to support a conclusion that 
CUMA is “an organization which finances or refinances any 
debt secured by an interest in real estate.” 18 U.S.C. § 27. 
Fattah and Vederman attempt to refute the argument 
that CUMA engages in financing mortgages by focusing on 
Toler’s testimony that CUMA “doesn’t actually have any 
money to fund these mortgage loans.” JA4239; see Fattah 
Reply Br. 38, Vederman Reply Br. 36. But Toler testified that 
CUMA employs a credit line to borrow the funds necessary to 
close on mortgages. See JA4239. That CUMA incurs debt to 
finance mortgages hardly undermines a conclusion that CUMA 
finances mortgages. Indeed, it is the very nature of modern 
banking that financial institutions do not hold cash reserves 
equal to the full amount of their liabilities. See, e.g., Timothy 
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C. Harker, Bailment Ailment: An Analysis of the Legal Status 
of Ordinary Demand Deposits in the Shadow of the Financial 
Crisis of 2008, 19 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 543, 561 (2014) 
(“[F]ractional reserve banking . . . is the de facto standard for 
all modern banks.”). 
Vederman also argues that, even if CUMA acts as a 
mortgage lending business in some transactions, it was not 
acting as a mortgage lending business in this transaction. 
Vederman points to Toler’s testimony that, in a state in which 
CUMA is not licensed, the mortgage is closed in the name of a 
credit union. In such cases, the credit union, and not CUMA, 
owns the mortgage for the short period before the loan is sold 
on the secondary market. JA4241. CUMA is not licensed in the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. See id. Thus, according to 
Vederman, CUMA was acting in its capacity as a mortgage 
servicing company for Fattah’s vacation home purchase and 
did not—and could not—finance Fattah’s mortgage. That 
would mean that CUMA could not have been a victim of a 
crime against a financial institution in this instance: “When an 
entity is not functioning as a mortgage lender, the ‘pertinent 
federal interest’ behind the statutes is not implicated.” 
Vederman Reply Br. 38 (citation omitted). 
The Government responds that neither of the statutes of 
conviction requires that the fraud or false statement occur in 
connection with the same transaction that places the entity 
within the definition of “financial institution.” Gov’t Fourth 
Step Br. 4. We agree with the Government. 
Both § 1344 and § 1014 protect entities that fall within 
the definition of “financial institution” and are otherwise quite 
broad in their application. See Loughrin v. United States, 134 
132 
S. Ct. 2384, 2389 (2014) (interpreting § 1344 as not requiring 
specific intent to defraud a bank); United States v. Boren, 278 
F.3d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[Section 1014’s] reach is not 
limited to false statements made with regard to loans, but 
extends to any application, commitment or other specified 
transaction.”). Neither statute is expressly limited in the 
manner that Vederman suggests. Williams v. United States, 458 
U.S. 279, 284 (1982) (“To obtain a conviction under § 1014, 
the Government must establish two propositions: it must 
demonstrate (1) that the defendant made a ‘false statement or 
report,’ . . . and (2) that he did so ‘for the purpose of 
influencing in any way the action of [a described financial 
institution] upon any application, advance, . . . commitment, or 
loan.’ ”); United States v. Leahy, 445 F.3d 634, 646 (3d Cir. 
2006) (“The purpose of the bank fraud statute is to protect the 
‘financial integrity of [banking] institutions.’ ”) (citing S. Rep. 
No. 98-225, at 377 (1983), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3517), abrogated on other grounds by Loughrin, 134 S. Ct. at 
2389. 
In support of his position, Vederman relies on United 
States v. Devoll, 39 F.3d 575 (5th Cir. 1994), in which the Fifth 
Circuit concluded that § 1014 (false statements to a financial 
institution) is not intended to capture fraud unrelated to an 
entity’s lending activities, and therefore held that it “applies 
only to actions involving lending transactions.” Id. at 580. The 
Fifth Circuit stated: 
[W]e are not persuaded that the statute imposes 
liability whenever a defendant’s false statement 
was intended to interfere with any activity of a 
financial institution; such a broad interpretation 
of section 1014 presumably would encompass 
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fraud or false representations having nothing to 
do with financial transactions, such as fraud in an 
employment contract or, for example, in a 
contract to provide goods or services for 
custodial care, premises repair, or renovation. 
Id. 
Yet a majority of circuits, including our own, have 
declined to follow Devoll’s suggestion that § 1014 is restricted 
to lending transactions. As the Ninth Circuit has held, “we join 
at least six of our sister circuits—the First, Third, Fourth, Sixth, 
Seventh, and Tenth—in holding that 18 U.S.C. § 1014 is not 
limited to lending transactions, and reject the minority rule to 
the contrary.” Boren, 278 F.3d at 915. And even if we were to 
adopt Devoll’s narrow construction of § 1014 to lending 
transactions, that would not resolve the more specific question 
of whether the defrauded entity must be defined as a “mortgage 
lending business” by virtue of the specific transaction in which 
the false statements arose. 
Recently, the Eighth Circuit addressed precisely this 
issue. In United States v. Springer, 866 F.3d 949 (8th Cir. 
2017), that Court considered the defendant’s appeal from the 
district court’s denial of a Rule 29 motion on grounds that 
GMAC, the entity defrauded, was not a “financial institution.” 
The Court upheld the district court’s determination that the 
evidence was sufficient to establish that GMAC is in the 
mortgage lending business because there was testimony that “it 
had made hundreds or thousands of loans secured by 
mortgages in 2010 and 2011 in states all across the country,” 
which established that its activities affect interstate commerce. 
Id. at 953. It was not determinative that GMAC did not own 
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the specific loan at issue in the case: “we discern no 
requirement in the definition of ‘mortgage lending business’ 
that the business own the particular loan in question; it need 
only finance or refinance any debt secured by an interest in real 
estate, or, in other words, be in the interstate mortgage lending 
business in general.” Id. 
In our view, the Eighth Circuit’s analysis is correct. We 
therefore adopt that Court’s reasoning in Springer and 
conclude that it is of no moment that CUMA did not finance 
the mortgage at issue in Fattah’s case. CUMA is a “mortgage 
lending business,” and that alone suffices to support the 
convictions under §§ 1014 and 1344. 
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence 
Finally, Vederman argues that, even if CUMA is a 
financial institution, the judgment of acquittal should stand 
because the Government did not put forth any evidence that he 
made a false representation to CUMA.33 Specifically, 
Vederman argues that the title to the Porsche was actually 
changed to his name, making it a “true sale” as a matter of law, 
without regard to whether Fattah’s wife continued to retain 
possession. See United States v. Castro, 704 F.3d 125, 139 (3d 
Cir. 2013) (holding in another context that “the government 
must be able to show that [the defendant] made a statement to 
                                              
33 Although Vederman presented this argument in his Rule 29 
motion, the District Court did not need to reach it in the context 
of Counts 19 and 20 because the Court granted the motion on 
the ground that CUMA is not a financial institution. The 
District Court rejected the argument as to Counts 16, 17, and 
18. See JA100–02. 
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government agents that was untrue, and the government cannot 
satisfy that burden by showing that the defendant intended to 
deceive, if in fact he told the literal truth”); see also 75 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 102 (defining “owner” as “[a] person, other than 
a lienholder, having the property right in or title to a vehicle”). 
The Government responds that, regardless of whether it 
is legally possible for one person to hold a title while a different 
person possesses the vehicle, the jury was permitted to 
consider all the circumstances in deciding whether the Porsche 
sale was a sham. We agree. 
First, as the District Court observed, it was unclear as to 
whether the title had been properly executed under 
Pennsylvania law. For instance, Fattah’s wife never appeared 
before a notary.34 JA101. In addition, title 75, section 1111(a) 
of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes requires that, “[i]n 
the event of the sale or transfer of the ownership of a vehicle 
within this Commonwealth, the owner shall . . . deliver the 
certificate to the transferee at the time of the delivery of the 
vehicle.” And, the transferee must, within twenty days of the 
assignment of the vehicle, apply for a new title. See 75 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 1111(b). Neither of these requirements was 
fulfilled. Finally, Vederman never registered the Porsche in his 
name with the Department of Motor Vehicles. See id.; JA4254. 
Second, and more importantly, even if the title had been 
properly transferred to Vederman, the title provisions of the 
                                              
34 Vederman argues that it is of no significance that the parties 
did not appear before a notary as the statute requires, but he 
offers cases only from states other than Pennsylvania to 
support this proposition. 
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Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code “were [not] designed to 
establish conclusively the ownership of an automobile.” 
Weigelt v. Factors Credit Corp., 101 A.2d 404, 404 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1953). Indeed, “[t]he purpose of a certificate of title is not 
to conclusively establish ownership in a motor vehicle, but 
rather to establish the person entitled to possession.” Speck 
Cadillac-Olds, Inc. v. Goodman, 95 A.2d 191, 193 (Pa. 1953). 
Thus, a title provides evidence of ownership; it is not 
dispositive of the issue. Wasilko v. Home Mut. Cas. Co., 232 
A.2d 60, 61 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1967). 
Vederman’s argument that the title in his name 
constitutes conclusive evidence of ownership rests upon an 
erroneous conclusion that the jury was prohibited from 
considering all the circumstances of the transfer. As the 
District Court observed, though, Pennsylvania’s 
Commonwealth Court has held that “[w]hether a transferor has 
transferred ownership of a motor vehicle to a transferee is a 
factual determination to be made by the court below.” Dep’t. 
of Transp. v. Walker, 584 A.2d 1080, 1082 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
1990). Thus, the signed certificate of title was appropriately 
treated as one piece of evidence for the jury to consider in 
assessing the validity of the vehicle transfer. Considered in the 
light most favorable to the Government, the totality of the 
evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s conclusion that the 
Porsche sale was a sham. 
XI. Prejudicial Spillover 
Finally, Fattah, Vederman, Nicholas, and Brand each 
contend that their convictions on various counts resulted from 
prejudicial spillover. We are not persuaded. 
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We exercise plenary review over a district court’s denial 
of a claim of prejudicial spillover, United States v. Lee, 612 
F.3d 170, 178–79 (3d Cir. 2010), and we apply a two-step test 
when reviewing such a claim. United States v. Wright, 665 
F.3d 560, 575 (3d Cir. 2002). First, a court must consider 
“whether the jury heard evidence that would have been 
inadmissible at a trial limited to the remaining valid count[s].” 
Id. (quoting United States v. Cross, 308 F.3d 308, 317 (3d Cir. 
2002)). The second step requires that we “ask whether that 
evidence (the ‘spillover evidence’) was prejudicial.” Id. We 
consider four factors: “whether (1) the charges are intertwined 
with each other; (2) the evidence for the remaining counts is 
sufficiently distinct to support the verdict on these counts; (3) 
the elimination of the invalid count [will] significantly 
change[] the strategy of the trial; and (4) the prosecution used 
language of the sort to arouse a jury.” Id. (quoting United 
States v. Murphy, 323 F.3d 102, 118 (3d Cir. 2003)); see also 
United States v. Pelullo (Pellulo II), 14 F.3d 881, 898–99 (3d. 
Cir. 1994). These four factors are considered in a light 
“somewhat favorable to the defendant.” Wright, 665 F.3d at 
575 (quoting Murphy, 323 F.3d at 122); see also Gov’t Br. 198 
(same). 
A. Fattah’s Claim of Prejudicial Spillover 
Fattah argues that he suffered prejudicial spillover on 
the remaining counts of conviction in light of (1) evidence 
pertinent to the alleged Vederman bribery schemes that is now 
arguably inadmissible under McDonnell; and (2) “the 
government’s flawed RICO conspiracy theory.” Fattah Br. 50, 
64. Fattah’s argument is undercut substantially because of our 
determination that McDonnell requires a new trial for Counts 
16, 17, 22, and 23 and our decision to affirm the RICO 
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conspiracy conviction. The only possible spillover left to 
consider is the evidence pertaining to Fattah’s arranging a 
meeting between Vederman and the U.S. Trade 
Representative, Ron Kirk, which in light of McDonnell is now 
arguably inadmissible.35 
The evidence of the Kirk meeting admitted during this 
five-week trial was limited. Although this evidence was part of 
the Government’s proof as to both the RICO and the bribery 
related charges, there is more than sufficient—and distinct —
evidence to support Fattah’s conviction on all the other counts. 
In our view, eliminating any evidence of the Kirk meeting 
would not have altered the strategy of the trial, nor should it 
significantly change the strategy for any new trial that may be 
held. Because Fattah has not pointed us to any argument by the 
prosecution relating to this meeting that could have inflamed 
the jury, we conclude that Fattah’s prejudicial spillover claim 
fails. Like the District Court, we presume that the jury followed 
the Court’s instructions to consider and weigh separately the 
evidence on each count as to each defendant and not to be 
swayed by evidence pertaining to other defendants.36 
                                              
35 Nothing in this opinion is intended to foreclose the 
possibility that evidence of the Kirk meeting may be 
admissible on retrial for some purpose other than as proof of 
an official act. 
36 We likewise reject Brand’s prejudicial spillover arguments. 
See Brand Br. 6 (“Brand adopts the significant issue advanced 
by his co-appellant pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 28(i) that 
improper jury instructions and the resulting spillover of related 
improperly admitted evidence and argument unfairly 
prejudiced Brand.”). 
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B. Vederman’s Assertion of Prejudicial Spillover 
Because the District Court acquitted Vederman of the 
RICO charge, Vederman argues that he was “severely 
prejudiced by the presentation to the jury of a legally flawed 
racketeering conspiracy charge,” and as a consequence his 
bribery and money laundering convictions should be 
overturned. Vederman Br. 46. In response to the Government’s 
appeal of the District Court’s Rule 29 acquittal on Counts 19–
20 involving CUMA, Vederman asserts that these two counts 
also were affected by spillover evidence because the 
Government’s theory tied the bribery charges to the actions 
taken to defraud CUMA. In that we are vacating Vederman’s 
convictions of Counts 16–18 and 22–23 based on McDonnell 
and remanding for further proceedings, we need address only 
Vederman’s argument of prejudicial spillover as it relates to 
the charges involving CUMA in Counts 19–20, charges that 
we will reinstate. 
The District Court’s acquittal of Vederman on the RICO 
count establishes that step one of the Wright spillover test has 
been met. “[T]he jury heard evidence that would have been 
inadmissible at a trial limited” to the bribery and CUMA-
related counts. Wright, 665 F.3d at 575 (quoting Cross, 308 
F.3d at 317). 
Wright’s second step requires “ask[ing] whether that 
evidence (the ‘spillover evidence’) was prejudicial.” Id. 
Vederman submits that the RICO, bribery, and CUMA-related 
charges were intertwined “in that the acts relating to the alleged 
bribery scheme were also charged as ‘predicates’ under 
RICO.” Vederman Br. 49. We disagree. 
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To be sure, the RICO, bribery, and CUMA Counts are 
related to one another. But in this instance, mere relatedness is 
not enough to demonstrate the foundation necessary for 
spillover. This is so because the bribery charges were a 
predicate to the RICO charge. In other words, the jury had to 
determine if Vederman was guilty of bribery, and the jury then 
used that “predicate” to consider whether he was also guilty of 
the RICO conspiracy. Thus, the necessarily tiered structure of 
the questions presented to the jury refute Vederman’s 
argument that the counts were intertwined. 
That the bribery charges were predicates for the RICO 
conspiracy further demonstrates that the “evidence for the 
different counts was sufficiently distinct to support the verdict 
on other separate counts.” Pelullo II, 14 F.3d at 898. 
Regardless of the evidence pertaining solely to the RICO 
conviction, the evidence supporting both the bribery charges 
and the charges involving CUMA in Counts 19–20 would have 
remained the same. 
The next factor we address is “whether the elimination 
of the count on which the defendant was invalidly convicted 
would have significantly changed the [defendant’s] strategy of 
the trial.” Id. As Vederman argues, “the RICO charge 
interfered with Vederman’s central defense to the bribery 
charge—that his gestures toward Fattah ‘were motivated 
purely by friendship.’ ” Vederman Reply Br. 28 (citing Gov’t 
Br. 200). In other words, the “RICO count made it dangerous 
to unduly emphasize [Vederman’s] close friendship” with 
Fattah. Id. From Vederman’s perspective, “a bribery-only trial 
would have reduced this danger and allowed a freer 
presentation of the defense.” Id. 
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It is quite likely that Vederman’s claim of friendship 
would have been less risky as a litigation strategy if he had not 
been facing a RICO charge. But Vederman nevertheless chose 
to take that risk and fully presented his friendship argument to 
the jury. Moreover, while Vederman’s reliance on friendship 
might have helped him defend against the bribery charges, that 
friendship would not have altered the evidence pertaining to 
Counts 19–20 involving CUMA. Whether done for friendship 
or some other reason, submitting fraudulent information to a 
financial institution is unlawful. 
Finally, we “examine the charges, the language that the 
government used, and the evidence introduced during the trial 
to see whether they are ‘of the sort to arouse a jury.’ ” Pelullo 
II, 14 F.3d at 899 (quoting United States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d 51, 
65 (2d Cir. 1983)). Vederman points out that Fattah was 
presented as “a backslapping, corrupt party boss,” with 
“predictable spillover to his friend and associate, Vederman.” 
Vederman Br. 50 (quoting United States v. Murphy, 323 F.3d 
102, 118 (3d Cir. 2003)). But this description was of Fattah, 
not Vederman. Vederman cites other examples of prejudicial, 
pejorative language in the Government’s closing arguments. 
At one point, the Government referred to “conspirators 
engaged in what can only be described as a white collar crime 
spree from Philadelphia all the way to Washington, D.C.” and 
promised “to untangle the webs of lies and deception that these 
conspirators spun.” Vederman Br. 51 (quoting JA5295, 5297). 
Whatever rhetorical flair these words contained, they did not 
obscure the evidence which independently supported the 
convictions for bank fraud at Count 19 and for making false 
statements to CUMA at Count 20. Accordingly, because we 
presume that the jury followed the District Court’s instruction 
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to consider and to weigh separately the evidence on each count 
and as to each defendant, and because the evidence supporting 
the CUMA-related charges in Counts 19–20 is sufficiently 
distinct from the RICO conspiracy, we conclude that 
Vederman’s spillover argument is unavailing.37 
XII. Conclusion 
We will vacate the convictions of Chaka Fattah, Sr. and 
Herbert Vederman as to Counts 16, 17, 18, 22, and 23. Fattah 
and Vederman may be retried on these counts before a properly 
instructed jury. We will also reverse the District Court’s 
judgment of acquittal on Counts 19 and 20. The convictions of 
Chaka Fattah, Sr. and Herbert Vederman will be reinstated, and 
the case will be remanded for sentencing on those counts. In 
all other respects, the judgments of the District Court will be 
affirmed. 
                                              
37 Nicholas adopted “pertinent portions” of the prejudicial 
spillover arguments advanced by Vederman and Fattah. 
Nicholas Br. 65. Her spillover claim has no more merit than 
theirs. Nicholas’s involvement in the RICO conspiracy was 
distinct from the bribery charges, which did not unfairly 
influence the other counts. As to Nicholas’s assertion that the 
NOAA charges did not belong in the indictment and should 
have been tried separately, we fail to see how this relates to a 
claim of prejudicial spillover. To the extent it challenges the 
District Court’s denial of Nicholas’s motion for a severance, 
Nicholas has failed to provide legal support for such a 
contention. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A); United States v. 
Irizarry, 341 F.3d 273, 305 (3d Cir. 2003). 
